

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FOR THE
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT

by

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I. INTRODUCTION

In military organizations planning is a finely tuned art if not a well developed science. Each major organization in the military establishment has planning sub organizations. Some indulge in "wish list" planning, some are involved with long-range planning, some concern themselves with the near-term planning cycles of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), some with war and campaign planning, and others with specific weapons systems or types of forces. Still other planning organizations in the Department of Defense (DoD) include planning portfolios on mobilization, the industrial base, rules of engagement, military exercise programs, and crisis responses.

Despite the wide spectrum of these efforts and the human and material resources devoted to the planning process, we constantly hear about the need for more thorough and precise planning within DoD. Whatever planning is currently being envisaged and developed, however heroic the effort, apparently is viewed as unsatisfactory. We have, it would seem, a major "planning gap."

During the last nine months, Associate Professors Nancy Roberts and James Tritten of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) have embarked on a project for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Net Assessment (OSD/NA). This project has subsequently received the endorsement and sponsorship of the National Security Council (NSC) Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Competitive Strategies and the Strategic Planning Branches.

The project began with conversations Associate Professor Tritten had with the Director, Net Assessment in 1986, prior to Professor Tritten's transfer from OSD/NA to NPS. This conversation dealt with: (1) what textbooks were being used for the teaching strategic planning, (2) the fact that existing texts and journal articles were oriented toward military strategy, strategic nuclear, or bureaucratic politics within the defense establishment, (3) a desire to involve the school with a grass-roots effort to upgrade strategic planning by creating a center of excellence that would be dedicated to teaching more than what is traditionally found at civilian (and even military schools), and (4) a conscious effort to look at business schools models of strategic planning and see what could be adapted for the DoD.

Eventually a concept for a three year project unfolded. This project, entitled "Strategic Management for the Defense Department" is an effort to improve both strategic planning and strategic management in the DoD by a reform movement centered around the education of military officers who have been earmarked to become professional strategic planners. This interim technical report will outline the basic problem (as it is viewed by the investigators), efforts to date, and a plan of action for the next two years. This interim report is being distributed to a wide audience of parties known to be interested in military strategic planning in the hopes that readers will comment on what they see.

The Concepts of Strategic Management and Long-Range Planning:

What we have termed as the "planning gap" is difficult to describe. What exactly is missing from our planning systems that provokes calls for more or better planning? One view, and the one we present in this report, is that the planning gap represents a lack of coordinated effort to integrate DoD's major goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. It is the lack of a mechanism to marshal and then allocate DoD's resources into a unique and viable posture based on its relative internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment, and contingent moves by intelligent opponents. What is missing is not long-range planning, nor is it the "silent P" of PPBS, but the planning that integrates DoD's disparate internal units into a coherent entity.

To begin the dialogue, we would like to first introduce our definition of "strategic management," since most military planners are more comfortable with the term "long-range planning" and may not have ever used the term "strategic management."

Strategic management integrates an organization's major goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. It marshals and allocates an organization's resources into a unique and viable posture based on its relative internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment, and contingent moves by intelligent opponents (An adaptation from Quinn, 1980--for full citations, see bibliography).

Strategic management is concerned with the management of the whole enterprise, not just its functional components or its sub parts. It becomes the challenge of the organizational leader (referred to as the general manager in business and industry) to combine and direct the efforts and activities of the other members of the organization toward the successful completion of a stated mission or purpose.

In comparison to other types of planning, strategic management also analyzes an organization's external environment and internal climate, and searches for new trends, discontinuities, surprises, and competitive advantages. Since its scope is broader than other types of planning, it typically embodies more qualitative shifts in direction than anticipated from the long-range planning process. Also guided by an idealized vision of the future, strategic management tends to be much more action oriented. The organization attempts to keep its options open, considering a variety of possible alternatives to respond promptly to unforeseen contingencies as it moves toward its ideal. (Bryson, 1988a, pp. 7-8).

Long-range planning, on the other hand, focuses more on specifying goals and objectives and translating them into current budgets and work programs. The objective of long-range planners (and short-range planners for that matter) is to work backward from goals to programs and budgets in order to map out the sequence of decisions and actions necessary to achieve the desired future which is embodied in the goals. Long-range planning, as a consequence, assumes that current trends will

continue into the future and plans tend to be linear extrapolations of the present (Bryson, 1988a pp. 7-8).

Paradigm Shifting:

Major changes to strategic planning and the introduction of strategic management into the DoD would, in addition to improving the planning process, likely result in a significant shift in the framework of planners to a new way of addressing problems and issues. The first order questions, such as "what is the business and purpose of the DoD," would deserve answers prior to consideration of second order programming or efficiency issues that now tend to dominate defense debate. Simply put, it is not enough for the Secretary of Defense to be only concerned if his department is well-prepared for a major war.

As a consequence, a paradigm shift could open up planners to considering issues more fitting the chief executive officer of a major international organization such as the long-term competition of nations in the changing international environment, the economic, political, and cultural aspects of competition, and the use of the military for other than a major war. Skeptics, however, argue that the application of business methods to the DoD has been tried and with disastrous results.

Competition, however, with the Soviets has been going on for years and will continue indefinitely. The United States simply cannot afford to continue devoting resources to defense without a well-thought-out strategy for competing. There is a need to set

positive goals for the military sector of this competition, and then develop programs to effectively and efficiently achieve these goals (Roche, 1976).

The changing international environment will likely be more significant in the next twenty years than it has been in the last twenty. Planning for long-term competition requires a 10-20 year planning horizon. We cannot afford to lock up our strategic options with force structures that were developed out of short-range planning assumptions. We also cannot afford to indulge ourselves with "gold-plated" strategies capable of successfully dealing with all possible contingencies on our own.

By the year 2010, the United States may be a superpower primarily because of its military power rather than because of its economic, political, and military power (Kennedy, 1987). The second major superpower in the world today, the USSR, may have been eclipsed by the economic (and perhaps political) power of Japan and China. American access to foreign bases may be significantly different than that we enjoy today and there will likely be new threats to face (Ikle & Wohlstetter, 1988).

Thus a fundamental paradigm shift in the way that planners look at the world could lead to less overall emphasis on the USSR and Europe (although the central problem for U.S. wartime strategy will likely remain the USSR and Europe) and a redirection toward managing day to day competition with other powers with significantly less capable tools in our kit. Rather than acting as a "Chairman of the Board" with our allies,

America's future role may be that of "first among equals (Marshall & Wolf, 1988, p. 18).

The technologies available for the military competition could improve so dramatically that the fundamental nature of warfare may change. Superpower competition in military hardware may shift from the nuclear arena to the non-nuclear. As non-nuclear weapons become more capable, they may substitute for nuclear weapons at the tactical, operational, and even the strategic level. The Soviets have already expressed their concern over this coming new "revolution in military affairs," while we in the United States tend to be more concerned with managing programs (Marshall & Wolf, 1988).

Thesis

From our observations, interviews, and work in DoD, it is our contention that the current emphasis in DoD is on planning, both long and short-range planning, not on strategic management and not on long-range international and inter-agency issues such as competition with other nations. For example, the Joint Staff Officers Guide issued by the Armed Forces Staff College, describes the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) as dealing with a series of six primary planning documents with direct ties to PPBS. The military tends to view planning as being either deliberate or time sensitive, requirements or capabilities driven, and organized on a global, regional, or functional basis; not with the strategic management of the total system, however that system is defined. The bias within the DoD is on military

solutions to what are in reality, political problems requiring coordinated government-wide solutions.

Evidence of the planning gap can be found in four major criticisms of DoD planning: strategic goals and objectives that lack clarity; a functional organizational design which impedes mission integration; overemphasis on budgets and programming needs to the detriment of overall policies and strategies; and ignoring other agencies, competitors and the external environment.

Each of the military Services have planning organizations. Some are associated with programming planning, some with the planning cycle associated with budgets, some with war and campaign planning, some with global or specified weapons systems or types of forces. Yet none, as far as we can ascertain, are devoted to strategic management of their organizations, as we have defined the term. None are devoted to a cooperative effort to successfully manage the DoD or the government as a whole or address the long-term competition issues addressed above.

We assert that to prepare DoD and the multitude of organizations it represents for the future, we must go beyond the narrow bounds of the budget and program cycle and shift the emphasis to a more comprehensive approach to the management of, at a minimum, DoD. We believe that comprehensive approach is best embodied in the principles of strategic management.

The Question

Our first order question, then, is to what extent can we take the principles of strategic management and apply them to DoD organizations and military affairs?

Strategic management assumes certain necessary and sufficient conditions to be effective. Some of the conditions, but by no means all, are: an agreement on goals and objectives or at least a mechanism by which the dominant coalition can develop some consensus on goals and objectives; a process by which the organization can scan its environment, monitor trends, and assess its competitors in order for the organization to assume an advantageous posture; control over the budget process which permits a reallocation of resources to fit the organization's strategy; a management information system which lays the base for an integrated communication and control system; and a review and monitoring process to ascertain whether the current strategies are viable or should be revamped.

To what extent do these conditions obtain in DoD organizations? While ideally it may be beneficial to strategically manage DoD, is it practically possible given the constraints and conditions of the current situation? To what extent should business methods be applied to the military? It is to this challenging question that we now turn.

II. CURRENT CONDITIONS IN DOD


DoD Size

A major challenge to the application of strategic management principles to DoD organizations is the sheer size of the system. The DoD is a cabinet-level organization within the executive branch of our federal government. There are twelve major defense agencies, eight major DoD field activities, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS), ten Unified and Specified combat commands, three (four if you count the Marine Corps) Military Departments, and thirty-three major officials within OSD reporting to the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). In time of war, one additional uniformed Service would come under DoD, the Coast Guard. Over five million active duty, reserve and civilian employees work directly for and over three million additional personnel in the private sector provide services or products to DoD.

Figure 1 is a basic line diagram of the Department's major agencies and organizations.

Figure 1

DOD ORGANIZATION



The DoD has some 1265 military installations and properties; 870 in U.S., 375 overseas in 21 countries, and 20 in U.S. territories. One quarter of all active duty military personnel are stationed outside of U.S. The FY-88 DoD budget included \$290.8B budget authority requested and \$285.5B budget outlays expected; roughly 5.7% GNP, 26.1% of federal outlays or 17% of net public spending. Also included in DoD's activities are just under \$7B in foreign military sales, \$906M in foreign government grant aids, and \$56M in international military training and education.

By contrast, Exxon, the number 1 Fortune 500 company, has around 139,000 employees, and has sales only half of DoD outlays. (Even AT&T at its largest in 1982 had fewer than one million employees before its breakup).

Thus, what all these figures point to is a picture of the largest and most complex organization in the free world. In the jargon of business, DoD is a very large multi-national corporation with an extremely diverse portfolio. How can anyone or any group strategically manage or even plan for operations for an enterprise of this size?

If we approach the problem from smaller organizational units, what is the appropriate organizational level? If we take the Navy itself, it is still a large organization.


The Department of the Navy (DoN) is a major military department but one with legacy of once having been a cabinet-level organization. The Secretary of the Navy or the Chief of

Naval Operations have forty-four major organizations reporting to them including two full military services (increasing to three in time of war with the transfer of the Coast Guard from the Department of Transportation).

Missions for the DoN include operations in space, in the air, on the land, at sea, and under the sea. The DoN is tasked with recruiting and training and equipping forces during peacetime and while Allied, Unified, and Specified Commanders outside of the Navy organization actually do the fighting during war.

Figure 2 is a line diagram of the Department of the Navy listing all of its major agencies and organizations.

ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY



*ALSO INCLUDES OTHER DESIGNATED ACTIVITIES NOT SHOWN ON THE CHART WHICH ARE UNDER THE COMMAND OR SUPERVISION OF THE ORGANIZATIONS DEPICTED

Thus, we are left with a major dilemma. Even when viewing the Navy's organizational system, we are confronted with the same problem of size. As with DoD, the Navy is a multi-national organization with a diverse portfolio. How can it be strategically managed to form a whole? If we find it difficult to apply strategic management principles at this level, what is the appropriate unit or level of analysis?

Deficiencies in DoD Structure and Processes

In addition to the problems of size, other conditions make application of strategic management in DoD a challenge. Many of these have been outlined in the staff report to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Locher, 1985). We will therefore draw freely from this material to illustrate why some of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of strategic management principles to DoD and its organizations may be problematic.

1. Limited Planning Integration at DoD's Policymaking Level.

The principal organizations of the Washington headquarters of the DoD are the OSD headed by the SECDEF, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS) headed by the CJCS, and the Military Departments headed by a Service Secretary and a career military officer who also has membership in OJCS. These Washington organizations are focused primarily on functional areas. Each agency in the Washington headquarters of DoD additionally maintains its own duplicate organizations for each of these functional areas.

Each Military Department has multiple and separate headquarters staffs: the Secretariat serving the Service Secretary and the military headquarters staff supporting the Chief of Staff or Chief of Naval Operations. This arrangement resulted in an unnecessary layer of supervision and duplication of effort. The existence of separate staffs leads to unnecessary supervision, delays, micro-management, and inefficiency. Military Department organization along functional lines makes OSD micro-management easier. Some of these problems have been solved by recent reorganization and consolidation. The organization of Military Departments reflects an earlier era when the Service Secretaries headed separate, cabinet-level departments which is no longer the case.

Organization by function serves to inhibit integration of Service capabilities along coordinated mission lines. This in turn hinders achieving a primary goal in the formation of the DoD in 1947; roles and mission integration. Headquarters organizational activity is focused on functional efficiency, the management and control of functional activities, and not on overall politico-military and warfighting missions and objectives.

Perhaps the best example of the orientation of DoD is that material inputs, not mission outputs, are emphasized. Despite the fact that the DoD exists to maintain and employ the Armed Forces, including timely and effective actions to ensure the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its

interests, the general focus of its Washington headquarters is not on war-fighting.

A focus on operational missions, where the Armed Forces may actually have to compete with an adversary, is lost in the functional orientation. At the end of a day when military strategic planning has occurred, it is quite likely that there has been no mention of the name of another country on the face of the earth. The focus has more likely been on programs, budgets, and obstacles.

Corporate-like strategic planning at the major headquarters for the DoD is inhibited by this absence of an overall organizational focus on major missions and strategic goals. Planning is undertaken to support organizational positions vis-a-vis Congress, the Office of Management and Budget, the SECDEF or his staff, the CJCS or the Joint Staff, or other Services. Service interests and programming rather than overall strategic needs play the dominant role in shaping planning decisions.

Tradeoffs between different capabilities or programs of different Services that can contribute to an overall DoD mission are seldom made. For example, Air Force officers might find it difficult to get positive recognition for suggesting that destruction of enemy targets could be more effectively performed by Navy missiles than by land-based bombers.

Routine functions that support another Service, especially those of airlift, sealift, or close air support, which are not central to a Service's own definition of its missions tend to be

neglected. The best example of this is the attention paid to strategic sealift. Tongue-in-cheek suggestions have been made in the past that perhaps the Army would be better served by having its own fleet! In the current Administration's defense, furnishing the afloat forces for strategic sealift mission has been recently elevated to one of the Navy's primary missions.

Non-traditional contributions to war-fighting missions outside the normal area for each Service (e.g., Air Force contributions to sea control) have not always been pursued. Interoperability and coordination requirements of forces from the separate Services, who must be able to operate together, are not readily identified. Again, to the credit of this Administration, a great deal of cross-service cooperation has occurred in the last eight years.

Headquarters organizations have been accused of being not fully attuned to the operational, especially readiness, requirements of the Unified, Specified, and Allied commanders that actually must direct the fight of combat. Despite the perception that the Service Chiefs or the JCS will direct wars, and despite the press coverage given to recent crisis management and the opportunities afforded by modern communications systems, war-fighting is directed by Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) out in the field rather than from the Washington headquarters. Until a more appropriate balance between functional and mission orientation is given to the Washington headquarters of DoD, effective mission integration will remain limited.

2. Lack of Clarity of Strategic Goals

Inattention to mission-oriented strategic planning at the Washington headquarters level has led to a lack of clarity of DoD's strategic goals. The stated goals are ambiguous and vague and vary depending whether or not one is doing planning to support programming or war planning. The general international goals of United States foreign policy have probably not changed since World War II. Despite this general consistency in obvious national goals, there is often a lack of agreement in the military Services and between the CinCs over what should the national goals or allocation of forces be during wartime in a major multi-theater conflict with the USSR. Making the connection between political goals and military capabilities is central to sound strategic planning and advise to decision-makers.

Washington headquarters must be involved in the setting of national goals in a war. Complicating this matter is that a future war is likely to be fought through an alliance structure (i.e. NATO) rather than alone. Washington's role may actually be in allocating resources to alliance military organizations and remaining national theater commanders.

In an international organization such as DoD, the clear articulation overall strategic goals in peacetime or during war can play an important role in achieving a coordinated allied effort toward these goals. Clarity of goals can enhance efficiency and capability.

DoD has been criticized widely, and incorrectly, for not having a strategy. The lack of a strategy is not the problem. DoD needs to maintain a well-designed and highly interactive strategic planning process that involves more than just military capability. We see a need for an integrated strategy, not only integrated internal to DoD, but integrated in terms of the entire Executive Branch and all of its attendant offices. A major problem, however, is how can we achieve this in a system that was designed to be as decentralized as possible, to avoid the dangers inherent in centralized authority, especially centralized military authority?

Another problem with government is that it is an extremely complex organization with coordination at the headquarters level being on an ad hoc basis rather than institutionalized. For example, most people in the business world understand that the environment they operate in is competitive in nature. One can make the same case for the international environment; the Soviet Union as a political actor representing a distinct ideology is in competition with democratic governments representing capitalism and free enterprise. Whereas there is no doubt that the Soviets understand this competition and are actively engaged therein, who is in charge of the competition at our end?

It is difficult to find coordinated international responses to Soviet political-military competition. Our project is not that grand, it is to merely identify the nature of the international competition at the national level, then to attempt to understand the role of government in that competitive process,

the role of the executive branch within the role of government, then the role of the Defense Department within that.

While we can learn from business and industry how difficult it is to do corporate-level strategic management for something as complex as the modern multi-national corporation, those of us schooled in the fields of foreign affairs or international relations still tend to view nations as a single actor; the United States will do this or that and then the Soviet Union may respond in the following way. Yet the reality of modern international affairs is that while government might be off doing something, businesses may be doing other things that could be 180 degrees out from the position taken by government.

3. Predominance of Programming and Budgeting

DoD suffers from the predominance in routine organizational activity of the programming and budgeting phases of the resource allocation process. This focuses the attention of DoD senior civilian and military officials on near term issues and inputs rather than outputs. This has led to insufficient attention to corporate-type strategic planning, war planning, operation matters, and execution and implementation of policy decisions. The Secretary himself, the critical civilian link in the chain of command, and one of two individuals that constitute the National Command Authority (NCA), probably pays insufficient attention to his wartime and other operational responsibilities.

By looking at the numbers of officers and civilians assigned to programming functions in the varying Washington headquarters vice those assigned to war plan type strategy or strategic planning, the bias can actually be documented. One might argue that in a war, many of these officers would transfer to allied military organizations or to the CinCs. It is not self-evident, however, that the skills of national Service programmers are transferable to the conduct of allied or joint wars and campaigns; hence even if this large population of programmers was shifted in time of war, the necessary experience and background might not be there.

Even within the category of programming, emphasis is generally given to the purchase of major weapons systems and not for routine and mundane things required for sustainability for actual combat operations. Simply put, the "star" performers are assigned to acquisition of "sexy" new weapons systems and not bullets and beans. Questions such as mobilization requirements for long-conventional conflict or civil defense preparations are generally relegated to second and third level offices.

The overemphasis on programming and the underemphasis of planning for operational matters are reflected in the professional development of military officers. The development of planning and execution skills needed in wartime has been given relatively low priority in the resource-oriented Services; technical, managerial and bureaucratic skills being rewarded instead.

We think this imbalance between headquarters staff functions and Allied/CinC operations is a major difference with industry where line operations tend to be emphasized and theoretically have the power to set corporate strategic direction.

4. Imbalance Between Modernization and Readiness

The imbalance between the interests of Washington headquarters and the CinC's interests is a major cause of the imbalance between modernization and readiness in the defense program. Overemphasis on acquiring future capabilities tends to deprive operating forces of capabilities needed to respond to today's or tomorrow's crisis. Current warfighting capabilities and sustainability are robbed to pay for hardware that may (or may not) prove useful in the distant future. This is similar to major corporate decisions over how much of the firm's profits should be directed towards internal research and development and how much for current operations.

The Services, however, have always thought that if needed, Congress would appropriate the funds to sail the ships and fly the planes--rather than seeing them tied up at anchor or parked on an airfield. The constituency for readiness is the CinC whose interests have been previously under-represented in senior decision-making councils. This was addressed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act and only time will tell if the reform will be successful. Goldwater-Nichols, however, does not provide a formal input from all NATO commanders who would command and control U.S. Armed Forces in the event of a war in Europe or the North Atlantic.

5. Imbalance Between Service and DoD/Joint Interests

Under previous arrangements, the Military Departments and Services exercised power and influence which were out of proportion to their statutory roles. The predominance of Service perspectives in DoD decision-making was understandable since DoD is (still) not organized to effectively integrate Service capabilities and programs into the forces needed to fulfill major missions, and since the old JCS system was dominated by the Services which retained effective veto power over JCS actions, and because the Unified commands were also dominated by strong and independent Service component commanders. Generally, undue Service influence arose principally from the weaknesses of organizations that are responsible for military operations, planning, and execution of plans.

This overwhelming influence of the Military Departments and Services worked and still works at cross-purposes to efforts to integrate the U.S. military establishment along mission lines focused on outputs rather than inputs. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was a major step taken by the Congress to legislate this problem away. Although many of these realignments were critically needed and were addressed in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, they will not, by themselves, be sufficient to correct the imbalance between Service and joint interests.

The concept of unified command, as originally formulated in the immediate postwar period has not been implemented. The authority of the unified commanders remains limited although enhanced by Goldwater-Nichols. The CinCs have somewhat more

authority and a greater influence (in theory) over resource allocation decisions. It remains to be seen whether as a result of Goldwater-Nichols, the Unified commands will remain loose confederations of single-Service forces which are unable to provide effective combined arms actions across the spectrum of military missions.

It has been claimed by defense critics that the operational deficiencies evident during the Vietnam War, the seizure of the Pueblo, and the Iranian hostage rescue mission were the result of the failure to adequately implement the concept of unified command.

The basic attitudes and orientations of the professional officer corps are a part of the problem. As long as the vast majority of military officers gives their highest priority to the interest of their Service or branch while losing sight of broader and more important national or cross-Service needs -- and believes that this behavior is correct because it is rewarded-- the problem of Service influence will remain. Powerful resistance to a more unified outlook will continue to be the basic orientation of military officers deeply immersed in the culture of their Services until there are changes in the system of Service promotions, military education, training, and assignments to produce officers with a heightened awareness and greater commitment to DoD-wide requirements and a genuine combined arms perspective.

The old JCS system was often criticized for being incapable of providing useful and timely collective military advice. The views of the JCS took entirely too long to prepare; and, most importantly, often did not offer recommendations on issues affecting more than one Service that were more than a compromise that would achieve the four Service's unanimous agreement.

Inadequate "joint" advice was found in DoD activities, including long-range strategic planning, programming planning, deliberate and time sensitive operational planning, force employment, discussion over roles and missions, organization of the Unified commands, and development of doctrine. The role of the CinCs, the CJCS, the collective JCS, each individual Service Chief and Secretary, and the SECDEF, to provide military advice on a substantial range of important strategy, resource, operational, and organizational issues was not entirely clear. An excellent example of this was the role played by Secretary of the Navy John Lehman in The Maritime Strategy; perceived by many to be a war-fighting strategy although the Secretary of the Navy has no statutorily assigned role in developing war plans or in carrying them out. Shortcomings in the ability of the military to meaningfully address combined arms operational and planning issues have had a serious impact on the ability of DoD to prepare for actual military operations.

By failing to provide sound military advice that crosses Service boundaries, the SECDEF has often resorted to using civilians, whether they are qualified or not, for advice on issues for which military recommendations would have been

preferred. The military was quick to criticize the direction of the Vietnam War from OSD but proved incapable of reorganizing in a manner that they could provide the SECDEF and the President with the type of policy recommendations and politically astute leadership that is required at the Washington headquarters level. When politico-military leadership was provided, it often came from the ranks of individuals who did not have educational backgrounds or experience in national security affairs. The bias is that any good staff officer should be able to fill such strategy positions, even if his Washington headquarters experience was in programming (or lacking altogether). The selection of Admiral William J. Crowe as CJCS was a clear exception but one man alone cannot make up for institutional deficiencies.

The dual responsibilities of the Chiefs of Staff of each of the Services, often referred to as "dual-hatting," is an inherent conflict of interest problem for the Service Chiefs. One job requires that they be effective advocates for their own Service. The other job expects them to subordinate years of experience and loyalties to Service interests to broader considerations. This is a demand that challenges the most enlightened Service Chief. Naturally, they have often been unable to balance these two conflicting demands.

"Dual-hatting" also overburdens the Service Chiefs of Staff by requiring them to shoulder more responsibilities than one person should normally handle. Performing all the duties

entailed in leading a military Service and assisting a Service Secretary is more than enough to fully consume the time and energy of a single individual.

The rational division of work among subordinate organizations is one of the basic mechanisms for enhancing organizational efficiency. Within DoD, this is often not done or the assigned division of work is ignored in practice. Excessive Congressional oversight micro-management of defense-wide programs and OSD micro-management of individual Service programs are key examples of this problem. The DoD has been generally unable to provide a more rational division of work among the operational commanders, the Services, and OSD.

There is also a lack of clarity on the division of work between civilian and military officials and organizations; yet civilian control of the military remains a major national goal. The NSC Staff, the State Department, and OSD contain many serving military officers; not that such officers should not be providing advise to civilian officials, but as it is well known, military officers have been placed into positions that would normally be considered political appointments.

In doing strategic planning, there is no standardization over who should be doing the planning. On the one hand, some organizations prefer to do all planning with in-house assets. On the other hand, some organizations prefer to contract out planning or rely upon the talents found in the private sector. Government, in addition, tends to think that technological

solutions will be provided by industry to all problems while industry tends to overestimate the ability of government personnel to compensate for poor performance by innovative operations.

On the international level, there has been some division of labor. Unfortunately, the result of these efforts have left the United States in an embarrassing position with regard to preparedness for national contingencies that have no role within NATO, e.g. mine warfare capabilities in the Persian Gulf. Clearly there is a need for national specialization, but we must recognize that a result of such cost-saving measures may mean an inability to perform tasks that are required in purely national contingencies.

6. Excessive Spans of Control and Insufficient Power

At most senior levels of the DoD, key leaders have an excessive number of subordinates reporting to them. As was mentioned earlier, twelve major defense agencies, eight major DoD field activities, the CJCS, ten Unified and Specified combat commands, three military departments, and thirty-three major officials within OSD report to the SECDEF. Likewise, the Service Secretaries and Chiefs of Staff have unwieldy spans of control. Effective supervision and coordination of excessive numbers of officials are not possible and as a result, organizational inefficiency is substantial.

The SECDEF may not be able to effectively manage so complex an organization as the DoD. The formal statutory authority of

the Secretary provides him a full measure of power; the problem emanates from a complex organization and powerful organizational forces whose vigorous pursuit of their own agendas can block change from above. The Secretary probably lacks the tools, levers, and organizational channels that he needs to effectively manage the vast defense bureaucracy. The SECDEF is confronted by powerful institutional forces that undermine his authority and can prevent him from carrying out his vast responsibilities.

Strengthening the power and influence of the SECDEF does not automatically mean increased centralization. When bureaucratic constraints and obstacles that diffuse the Secretary's power are removed, he will be able to decentralize management authority without losing control. Many recommendations for defense reform offer the potential for the SECDEF to realize the advantages of decentralized management without loss of control.

7. Inadequate Quality of Strategic Planners

Problems with the quality of DoD strategic planning or politico-military personnel have been mentioned previously. This problem occurs in political appointee positions, the Service Secretariats, in joint duty military positions, and especially in duty assignments with Allied military organizations. Political appointees are a problem because of their relative inexperience (in some cases), high turnover rates, as well as lengthy vacancies. For example, the position of Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) remained unfilled for an extended period following the resignation of Dr. Fred Ikle.

Extended periods of on-the-job training substitute for education and previous experience. DoD has given insufficient attention to the development of military officers capable of effectively performing politico-military and strategic planning duty assignments. Substantial disincentives to making such duty a career path continue to persist. Goldwater-Nichols has certainly forced the Services to change their assignment patterns with regard to joint duty, but the question remains if the Services have internalized such change mandated from outside or whether they will revert to previous methods once key Congressional leadership changes.

Even within Service staffs, strategic planning billets are often filled by individuals who lack the requisite education and designation as a strategic planner. Top performing officers often see it to their best interests to come to Washington for a tour in procurement rather than in policy planning. Top performing officers, when assigned to policy planning staffs, are often shuttled into key offices where they serve a brief first experience generating tour prior to returning to operational commands.

Strategic planning education and training have been addressed by the Congress as well as the DoD since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The recent emphasis on "joint" education misses the mark since it only addresses part of the problem. Furthermore, the attempt to upgrade education and training has now become a basic power struggle between the DoD and the Congress on who should control officer's careers.

Although efforts to improve "joint" education and training are movements in the right direction, they do not address the concepts of strategic planning and strategic management that are central to this research project. Moreover, many of the "strategy" courses taught by the DoD focus on historical case studies and are taught by historians rather than social and political scientists that are oriented toward alternative futures and the need to deal with uncertainty.

Some critics argue that the overriding solution to DoD organizational problems is to improve the caliber of strategic planners through education. While improving the quality of DoD's planners is an important initiative, it should not, however, be seen as a total substitute for organizational reform. Good people can, to a certain extent, overcome a deficient organizational structure. A well-designed structure, however, will support a higher level of sustained effectiveness and obviate making choices between good people and sound structure. Efforts to improve DoD's strategic planning performance should emphasize both structural change and enhancement of the skills of strategic planners.

8. Inconsistent and Contradictory Pattern of Congressional Oversight

Because the Congress has a central role in the overall planning and management of the Nation's security, it must share responsibility for any fundamental problems. The structure of the Congress and its procedures for review produce inconsistent and sometimes contradictory patterns of oversight, guidance, and

micro-management. The existing pattern of oversight and shared responsibility reinforces functional and other divisions within DoD, inhibiting the development of a coherent and integrated defense program. The Congress has been a major contributor to the lack of mission integration and focus on outputs by the DoD.

There are a number of aspects to the Congressional problem. First, multiple committees have cognizance over substantive and fiscal issues; all issuing different instructions and providing oversight with different structures, styles, and traditions. These differences foster genuine confusion and successfully tempt factions within DoD to export conflicts to the Congress. Congressional interest on policy and program conflicts and tensions within DoD, reinforces those conflicts. This problem, however, is not limited to the Defense Department. One might argue that the Congress has favored independent subordinate military offices as opposed to centralized control in DoD, in order to maximize their leverage in directing the allocation of resources of determining the outcome of policy disputes.

Second, the Congress tends to review the defense program in terms of individual Service programming inputs rather than in terms of mission outputs. Trade-offs between Service capabilities are made as often as they are in DoD itself. Adjustments to the budget are often made for financial reasons rather than for substantive reasons of priorities among missions. Again, this problem is hardly limited to defense.

Current congressional oversight and review practices have resulted in substantial instability in defense policies and programs. In part, this is the result of overemphasis of the congressional budget process which has overwhelmed the remainder of the legislative agenda. Increasingly, the Congress is becoming involved in the details of the defense budget, not just the broad policies and directions that guide it. Instability in defense policies and programs has been further heightened by the tendency of the Congress to look at military activities in only fixed yearly increments with predictable short-sighted results.

Despite these problems, there is no move afoot to increase the efficiency of the overall governmental planning, programming, and budgeting process. This is understandable given our Constitution, general distrust of government by the electorate, and desire to maintain a separation of powers. Rather than focus on how the planning process could be improved vis-a-vis Congress, it is more appropriate to document the institutional realities and search for means to cope.

9. Insufficient Mechanisms for Change

All military organizations throughout history, like all large organizations, have been noted for their resistance to change. The U.S. military establishment is no different in resistance to change. However, in DoD, this tendency is magnified by certain systemic problems that have been discussed previously. Key among these problems is the inability to avoid roles and missions disputes despite bureaucratic agreements among the

Services which should have solved them; the Key West Agreement, the Unified Command Plan, and other JCS Publications and agreements being key examples; the predominant influence of the Services; and Service control over promotions and assignments of all military officers, including those in joint duty billets and at Allied military organizations.

The result of these systemic problems is that DoD does not have effective mechanisms for change; it lacks the ability to correct certain deficiencies on its own. Despite often substantial evidence of poor performance, DoD, like any organization, expends much of its energies on defending the status quo. The absence of an effective process of internal self-correction and self-modification has resulted in an undesirable rigidity in DoD organization and procedures and further Congressional interference.

10. Inadequate Feedback

Related to insufficient mechanisms for internally generated change is the absence of useful feedback in many activities in DoD. This particular criticism seems astounding to the average line officer since so much of his time is consumed with the compilation and reporting of facts to seniors in the chain of command. Effective management control is not possible without useful and timely feedback on actual operations and implementation of plans. There is a strong need to simplify the gathering of data and to find some mechanism to simplify its presentation to key decision-makers.

Despite the fact that we will fight any future war in Europe under the command of long-established allied military organizations and in conjunction with Allies, not all the Allies have been willing to share information with each other in peacetime. France, for example, maintains a war-ready stockpile of materials and supplies but the United States has been unable to obtain the contents of those reserves and therefore conduct adequate pre-war planning for mobilization needs. Numerous Allies have asked over the years whether or not forces normally assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command would "swing" to Europe in the event of a war; only to receive conflicting responses.

The absence of useful feedback reduces management control of the planning and the resource allocation process. It also precludes learning important lessons from poor staff preparation and inadequate organizational performance. Past mistakes do not receive the critical analysis and review that would hopefully prevent them from recurring. DoD has not established a tradition of comprehensive, critical, and internal evaluation of its own performance in many areas of politico-military affairs. Rather than concentrate on the outcome of crises that made use of military forces, most flag and general officers prefer to discuss the number of times a particular force was used. The proper measure of effectiveness would be if the use of force, or that particular force, had an effect on the long-term outcome of the crisis.

III. REFORM INITIATIVES

We have seen in the previous sections that many of the necessary conditions to strategically managing DoD and its multiple organizational units currently do not exist. In fact, the present system has built in impediments to the effective exercise of strategic management. We are thus confronted with a dilemma. To what extent is the goal of introducing strategic management in DoD too ambitious for the organization's present capacity to respond and adapt? How realistic is it to pursue this goal given the organizational and interorganizational realities?

Our position on this issue is as follows. While the full application of strategic management to DoD and DoD organizations may not be possible at the present time, the immediate goal of laying the groundwork to make strategic management an eventuality in the future is realistic. If some of the barriers to strategic management can be eliminated, if some support for the principles of strategic management can be built among military personnel, if some of the tools and techniques of strategic management can be introduced and used in our organizations to help DoD adapt and change, then we will be well on the road to the full-scale introduction of strategic management to DoD.

We recognize that this interim process will not be easy and that it must be approached from many different levels. Congress has taken an important step with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. Changes in DoD structure, processes and systems and in the

areas of military strategy, procurement, officer education, and promotions are important beginnings:

- enhanced power of the CJCS to make recommendations of his own as well as to represent the views of the collected JCS. The Chairman is assisted by a new four-star Deputy.

- the views of the war-fighting CinCs are to be sought more often in the programming and budgeting process.

- joint duty is now required for promotion to flag/general officer. Joint duty cannot be performed until the officer is a graduate of a joint professional military education course.

- the Service Secretary and military staffs have been consolidated to some degree.

However, these efforts are only a beginning. More needs to be done, especially at the individual level of analysis -- in the education and training of our officers. We need to instill in them an appreciation and working knowledge of strategic management tools, strategies and principles. This is how we see our role in the change process at NPS. While corrections in DoD structure and process may be beyond our purview, part of our charter is the education and development of officers in DoD strategic management.

In this section, we will outline the current educational reform efforts underway in both the National Security Affairs (NSA) Department and the Department of Administrative Sciences at NPS.

Background.

The NPS has the charter for education of naval officers in the strategic planning subspecialty. Such education is not provided during the officer recruitment process nor is the

strategic planning subspecialty code awarded following attendance at one of the Service Command and Staff or War Colleges.

In order to be designed a strategic planner, the Navy has provided NPS with criteria which must be satisfied. These criteria, known as educational skill requirements, are as follows:

"Graduates of this program will possess a firm understanding of the broad range of considerations involved in the formulation of U.S. national policy and military strategy. This will include an appreciation of the threats to the United States and its allies, the mechanics of U.S. policy formulation, the development and execution of military strategy, the components of that strategy, and the assets available to meet national strategic objectives. The following specific requirements will be addressed:

Threats

The Soviet Union - A thorough understanding of the Soviet Union to include the historical development of the Soviet State and the Warsaw Pact; the relationship of Soviet political, economic and military doctrine; Soviet political and military involvement in third world insurgency; nuclear and conventional military doctrine and strategy; Soviet role in nuclear proliferation; Soviet resources and mobilization potential; and a net assessment of U.S./USSR economic and military strength.

Other threats - An appreciation for other threats to U.S. interests and those of its allies, which should include such issues as the Middle East confrontations including Muslim fundamentalism, the Arab/Israeli conflict, and the Persian Gulf War; the growth of international terrorism; threats to the Pacific Rim including Philippine insurgency, North Korea, and Vietnam; instability in Central and South America and Africa; and other issues of contemporary concern.

Formulation of U.S. Policy

The formulation of U.S. National Security Policy and Foreign Policy. This should address the role of the President, NSC, intelligence organizations, Congress, State Department, DoD, JCS and interagency groups in policy formulation, and the range of measures available

to the U.S. to meet its policy objectives such as arms control agreements, security assistance, membership in international organizations, bilateral diplomacy and application of military power.

Development and Execution of Military Strategy

American military history including the origins and evolution of national strategy; current American and allied military strategies which addresses the entire spectrum of conflict; the U.S. Maritime Strategy; the organizational structure of the U.S. defense establishment; the role of the CinCs in strategic planning; the process of strategic planning; joint and Service doctrine, and the roles and missions of each meeting national strategy.

Assets Available to Meet National Objectives

Nuclear deterrence - U.S. nuclear capabilities and doctrine including capabilities of each Service; current and projected Soviet nuclear capabilities and doctrine; current and projected capabilities of China, France, the United Kingdom and other potential nuclear powers; Nuclear command, control, and communications including U.S./NATO organization for nuclear war; basic nuclear weapon allocation and application theory including impact of footprinting weapons, nuclear planning factors, and the targeting process (Single Integrated Operational Plan and Theater Nuclear Forces) at the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff, Dahlgren, etc.

Space - Development of the Strategic Defense Initiative including doctrine for use, potential capabilities, and economic, political and technological restraints; antisatellite and other military applications of space; launch capabilities and supportability issues of the U.S. space program.

Technology - The role of U.S. technological superiority in the development of defense strategy and the implication of technology transfer on national security.

Chemical and Biological Warfare - Doctrine regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons, global balance of these weapons, treaties regarding their employment, and history of their use.

Logistics - Mobilization capability of the U.S. and its allies including the adequacy of their industrial base, natural resource supplies, reserve forces, etc. to meet strategic planning objectives; the role of mobilization in deterrence, the importance of logistics throughout the planning process.

Economics - Implications of U.S. defense budgets on the American economy, political factors involved in the formulation of the defense budget, and the mechanics of the defense budgeting process; the PPBS.

Alliances U.S. involvement in alliance relationships including a thorough understanding of the history and substance of NATO, and an appreciation for other alliances such as the Organization of American States, the Australian-New Zealand-U.S. Treaty and arrangements with Japan, the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, etc.

Intelligence - U.S. intelligence resources, methodologies and reliability.

Naval Warfare - Recent developments in naval warfare and their contributions to meeting National and Maritime Strategies.

Diplomacy - Use of negotiations, trade agreements, and other diplomatic measures to achieve national objectives.

International Law - Rudiments of international law including law of the sea and the laws of war."

Curriculum Goals

The focus of NPS educational efforts in strategic planning is to develop the student's craftsmanship in the art and the understanding of the strategic planning and strategic management process, not to give the student training on the current answers or strategies of fashion. The faculty is encouraged to have the student master principles of planning and management that they can later employ to help top leadership of the DoD manage change.

Having the students recognize that national defense is achieved with more than the resources available to the DoD will be a major goal and logical result of our efforts. Strategic planning simply must be more than a discussion of the share of the budget available to DoD or any one Service and include an

examination of peacetime (and wartime) national goals and objectives, including an analysis of the vast governmental and private tools which can be mobilized to achieve those goals. Similarly, the students are taught that there are many more resources to draw upon than the traditional ones taught in political science departments at civilian graduate schools.

One of the immediate objectives of our sponsored project is to revisit the above listed educational skill requirements in conjunction with a regularly scheduled curricular review of the NSA Programs in the Spring of 1989. This review will have the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations - Plans, Policy, and Operations (OP-06), or his designated representative, review the current requirements and make revisions as necessary.

It is the investigators' contention, and apparently those of the sponsors of this project, that the educational skill requirements for politico-military strategic planners are basically sound but that they could benefit from some marginal improvements along the lines of the concepts outlined in this report. Associate Professor Tritten will take the lead role in explaining these concepts to the Navy staff personnel assigned to the curricular review in order to secure the desired changes.

Figure 3 is a listing of the current matrix outlining the courses that NPS offers to strategic planning students to meet the requirements for designation as a strategic planner and earn the Master of Arts degree. For those readers interested in a

brief catalog description of each of the courses, we have attached them as Appendix A.

The current matrix does not show the new Administrative Sciences Department capstone strategic management course, MN 4105, being required for strategic planners. That course will be phased into the curriculum during the Spring Quarter of academic year 1989. The course that it will replace has not been identified at this time.

CURRICULUM 686/687
STRATEGIC PLANNING

Figure 3.

WINTER	SPRING	SUMMER	FALL	WINTER	SPRING
NS 3000 MILITARY HISTORY: WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD	NS 3030 AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY/ DEFENSE ORGANIZATION	NS 3230 STRATEGIC PLANNING AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY	NS 4261 SURVEY OF STRATEGIC STUDIES	NS 3250 DEFENSE RESOURCES ALLOCATION	NS 4230 SEMINAR IN STRATEGIC PLANNING
NS 3022 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING	NS 3050 MARITIME STRATEGY	NS 3280 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY	NS 3902 MODERN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL TERRORISM	NS 4500 SEMINAR IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST	NS 4251 AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND NET ASSESSMENT
NS 3960 INTERNATIONAL LAW & THE LAW OF WAR	NS 3012 FORECASTING AND RESEARCH METHODS FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING	NS 4280 ADVANCED TOPICS IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DETERRENCE	NS 4220 THREAT ANALYSIS AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	NS 4451 ADVANCED TOPICS IN SOVIET NAVAL AFFAIRS <u>OR</u> NS 4252 MARITIME POWERS AND FOREIGN POLICY	NS 4950 SEMINAR ON ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY
NS 3400 DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY	NS 3410 SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY	NS 3450 SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY	NS 3452 THE NAVY IN SOVIET STRATEGY	NS 0810 THESIS RESEARCH	NS 0810 THESIS RESEARCH
NS 1010 ELEMENTARY STATISTICS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (SELF STUDY)					

Research Output

The principle output from the research will be an NPS technical report which will be used as a textbook. It is anticipated that the textbook will be used at NPS in two different academic departments and at the Defense Resources Management Education Center (DRMEC). We naturally hope that the text will find use at the National Defense University, Service Command and Staff and War Colleges, and at Service academies.

A significant by-product of the textbook creation will be the teaching of strategic management and strategic planning courses and classes. As a result of the teaching effort, NPS hopes to build a cadre of people who understand the long-term competitive international political-military environment and the need to manage institutions over time. Our efforts are intended to create a consciousness and a language of strategic management within the DoD. We are therefore consciously attempting to change the corporate culture of DoD.

Research Team

Approaching change at this level is difficult, but we recognize that it is only the beginning of an effort that will require the collective energy of many different people and organizations. At present, we have involved personnel from each of the four sponsoring organizations, NPS faculty and students from the NSA Department, the Administrative Sciences Department, DRMEC, as well as the 1988-89 Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution, and individuals employed at the

Analysis Center of the Northrop Corporation. There are additional individuals who may join the research team as they are exposed to our project plans.

Associate Professor James Tritten is a Navy Commander who is currently serving as the Chairman of the NSA Department. In previous tours of duty, he has been the Assistant Director, Net Assessment, in OSD, and the Joint Strategic Plans Officer on the Navy Staff. Professor Tritten is a proven Navy subspecialist in both general and nuclear strategic planning. He has a Ph.D. and M.A. in international relations from the University of Southern California.

Associate Professor Nancy Roberts is a member of the Administrative Sciences Department where she specializes in teaching strategic management. She has served as the principal investigator on a number of related research projects and been a professional management consultant for a number of major firms for over ten years. She has a Ph.D. from Stanford University in Education specializing in organizational change and development and an M.A. in history from the University of Illinois.

One associate investigator, a faculty member at DRMEC, Dr. Darnell Whitt, will join the research effort when he reports for duty as an Associate Professor in November 1988. Dr. Whitt will be leaving his present position as the Intelligence Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. It is anticipated that he will concentrate on the intelligence aspects of strategic planning.

The final associate member of the research team is CDR John Kenney, USN, this year's Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the Brookings Institution. CDR Kenney desired to spend a portion of his fellowship year working on a strategic planning project. John intends to fully investigate the recent strategic planning effort conducted by Australia and to analyze the success of both the planning effort and the execution of those plans. CDR Kenney will prepare a full case study which will be published by NPS as a technical report and be made available to students taking our related courses as well as those in the Far East area studies program.

Efforts During Fiscal Year 1988

Work commenced on the project in January 1988 with a research trip by Associate Professor Roberts to the Washington, D.C. area and interviews with a number of key individuals in the field of DoD strategic planning. The major effort was to acquaint Professor Roberts with the DoD and the magnitude of the problem. At the same time, Associate Professor Tritten was gathering resources in Monterey and preparing the course outline for the first revised NSA Department Seminar in Strategic Planning, NS 4230. This course is the capstone for strategic planning students and is only taught once a year. The course outline is attached as Appendix B.

NS 4230 was first taught in a major revised fashion during the Spring Quarter of Academic Year 1988. Students who took this course were assigned case studies that had been suggested by the

sponsor. Sixteen case studies were developed and have been typed into a project report and distributed to the sponsors and other interested parties: "Student Reports in Strategic Planning," NPS-56-88-031PR, September 1988, 301 pp.

The cases developed by the students in NS 4230 and printed in that project report are contained in Figure 4:

Figure 4

STUDENT REPORTS IN STRATEGIC PLANNING
NPS-56-88-031PR

Part I: National Headquarters Level Strategic Planning/Management

- The 1987 and 1988 Reports on the National Security Strategy
- A Planning System Case Study Analysis of Discriminate Deterrence
- Competitive Strategies
- The Marshall Plan: A Case Study in Strategic Planning
- McNamara and Program Budgeting: Is the First "P" in "PPBS" Silent

Part II: Navy Strategic Planning

- The Navy's General Board
- United States Inter-War Planning--From Orange to Rainbow
- The B-36/USS United States Controversy
- Navy Long-Range Planning: The Extended and Strategic View
- Sea Plan 2000: Naval Force Planning Study
- The Maritime Strategy: A Case Study in Strategic Planning

Part III Other Cases of Strategic Planning/Management

- Air Force Long Range Planning
- The National Defense Stockpile: Planning for Mobilization or Politics?
- The Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Planning for Petroleum Security
- NASA in the 1960s: Management Success, Planning Failure
- The Supersonic Transport

Part I of the student reports contains examples of strategic planning and management done at the Washington headquarters level. The first of these is an example of strategic planning which results from a Congressional mandate, and performed by line organizations within the executive branch of government. The two

White House reports, National Security Strategy of the United States, represent planning in the abstract - a plan not tied at all to any execution effort.

The second report is an example of a Blue-Ribbon panel commissioned jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. As the previously mentioned White House reports, Discriminate Deterrence is the result of planning done without regard to execution of that plan under a strategic management scheme. The third report is the result of original research done by a student on the introduction of competitive strategies (a business concept) into the Defense Department. Since this is an on-going effort, complete findings are premature.

The final two cases presented in Part I are examples of strategic management at the national level. In the case of the Marshall Plan, multiple agencies in Washington were able to agree on an international plan of action and successfully execute that plan. In the case of PPBS, introduced into the DoD during the tenure of Secretary Robert S. McNamara, the plan for PPBS was developed and executed, with mixed results. Like many reform efforts, PPBS was an attempt to introduce rationality into what is an otherwise political decision-making process.

Part II contains individual reports that are examples of Navy strategic planning and one case of joint service planning with emphasis on the Navy and a maritime theater of military operations. The focus on the Navy, despite the lack of official

sponsorship of this project by the Navy, is logical since the student body of the NSA classes is entirely made up of active duty naval officers who are enrolled in the strategic planning curricula.

The first case in Part II involves a historical example of strategic planning done by the Navy prior to World War I. Inter-War strategic planning and in particular, war planning, is examined in the second case study. In both cases, the relationship of pre-war planning to execution of plans during a war is of interest to the reader.

The third report in Part II deals with attempts to implement strategic plans by two services that were in disagreement over basic roles and missions. The post-War B-36/USS United States controversy is well known within the defense community as an example of interservice rivalry at its most damaging.

The final three reports in Part II deal with more recent attempts at long-range strategic planning within the Navy. The first is an overview of general efforts within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The second is an examination of a special ad hoc planning effort conducted by the Navy that made use of the expertise at the Naval War College.

The final report in Part II is a look at the creation of The Maritime Strategy under the Reagan administration. The Maritime Strategy is an example of strategic planning and strategic management conducted by a staff organization itself. The results

of this section are, in part, a result of participation by faculty and students in the "Maritime Strategy in the Pacific Conference" held at the NPS during August 1987. At that conference were many of the individuals who were responsible for the writing of The Maritime Strategy and others who worked on earlier and similar concepts of operations. The conference was sponsored by the Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy (Policy).

Part III contains additional strategic planning cases that Navy strategic planning students would have not normally been exposed to prior to this research project. The first of these involves Air Force efforts in long range planning. The Air Force method of planning is in sharp contrast to that of the Navy. The final NS 4230 seminar session included a retired Army general officer whose focus was on the differences in substance and style in service strategic planning efforts. The final session also addressed the question "should naval officers be strategists?"

The next two reports concern multi-agency efforts to manage the national defense stockpile and strategic petroleum reserve. Both endeavors involve strategic analysis, planning, and actual execution of plans. These two plans involve international economic and politico-military affairs and both thoroughly involve the legislative and executive branches of the government.

The final two student reports involve strategic planning by non-defense organizations. The report on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) finds that good management can overcome poor planning. The second, the

Supersonic Transport, involves reasonably good planning but a failure to successfully execute the plan.

Each of the student papers is supposed to have a background of the international or national context at the time, a brief description of the strategic planning/management system itself, key assumptions made by personnel involved in the process, and an analysis of the key elements that resulted in success or failure of the plan or the execution of that plan. Some of these student reports will eventually be developed into formal case studies and included in our final technical report at the end of the three years research effort.

One of the questions that we have had to ask ourselves is whether significant politico-military case studies only can be researched and taught at the classified level? If this proves to be the case, we will have to deal with these cases in a classified teaching environment and issue a classified appendix to planned government technical reports, omitting those cases from any commercial books that subsequently follow.

One of the benefits of teaching this capstone course at a military school was that the instructor and students were able to refer to classified documents when it came time to discuss actual war planning as a strategic planning case study. The major differences between doing planning for near-term conflict, based on forces actually on hand, and planning for programming, based on goals and the ability to build new forces, is rarely

appreciated at any civilian school and often not within the DoD itself.

Professor Roberts audited NS 4230 to get a better idea of the perspective of politico-military students rather than those with a business outlook. She presented a series of guest seminars to introduce the concept of strategic management. At the same time, Professor Roberts prepared a course outline for a Strategic Management: Public and Private seminar for the Administrative Sciences Department. This course, MN 4105, also is a capstone course for students enrolled in varying administrative sciences curricula.

In MN 4105, students were previously oriented toward business methods and examples. Professor Roberts increased the emphasis of strategic management in the public sector and used some of the reports prepared by the NSA students. The two departments will attempt to improve their ability to cross-fertilize their curricula by sharing faculty. In academic year 1989, one NSA faculty member will teach a basic organizational theory course to administrative sciences students, introducing them to more DoD issues and case studies. NSA strategic planning students will have their education matrix changed to be enrolled in MN 4105 prior to taking NS 4230 during their last quarter. The course outline for MN 4105 is attached as Appendix C.

During the Summer Quarter of Academic Year 1988, the investigators met with all the sponsors and selected additional interested parties from Northrop Corporation. They reported on

the progress to date and distributed advance copies of the case studies developed by the students. The two-day meeting generated a significant amount of discussion and suggestions were made by the participants as to the composition of the NSA curricula in strategic planning. Revised matrices were offered as well as outlines for some additional recommended courses. Some of the changes that will be made to the strategic planning curriculum will be done locally. Some will be discussed with the Navy sponsor for these programs during a scheduled curriculum review in the Spring of 1989. The Superintendent of the NPS attended a final wrap-up session with the sponsors and the investigators.

The investigators also met with a number of government agencies and private firms during the Spring and Summer Quarters in order to evaluate their efforts in doing long-range strategic planning and strategic management. Initial interviews were held with the Navy Civil Engineering Laboratory, the Rockwell Corporation, and Boeing Aerospace.

The investigators had previously met with representatives of the U.S. Department of Commerce staff concerning this project. One of the areas that we learned about was the existence of the National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER). Membership of the NDER includes many current and retired chief executive officers and corporate strategic planners. All are concerned with the lack of industrial mobilization planning within the U.S.

In September 1988, the investigators met with NDER staff and members in Atlanta, Chicago, Monterey, and Washington, D.C.

Presentations on the project were made to members and staff assembled for their annual training sessions. A number of NDER members contacted the investigators and offered to share insights and experiences that may prove to be useful to the project.

Additionally, two students were supervised by the investigators in their own thesis research. The first of these was "A Theory of Naval Strategic Planning" by Lieutenant John R. Hafey. LT Hafey's thesis, completed in June 1988, proposed a theory for naval strategic planning that would be useful for programming. It identifies and describes those factors which should have an influence on how the Navy determines future force requirements and eventual capabilities.

LT Hafey's work was based upon the rational actor model where naval long-range planning would be derived from national military strategy, the role of sea power in the context of national requirements, nationally derived missions, and future trends in technology and warfare. LT Hafey attempted to reconcile the need for planning with the inability of social scientists to predict the future.

Sponsors were provided copies of this thesis during their meeting in Monterey. An additional seventy-five copies were sent to military planning staff offices, libraries, and selected defense contractors. Other interested parties may obtain a copy of this thesis from the Defense Technical Information Center. Associate Professor Tritten was the advisor for this thesis.

The second of these student theses is "The Rand Strategy Assessment System: A New Perspective on Decision Support Systems," by Lieutenant Commander Philip K. Siddons. LCDR Siddons looked into modern on-line strategic analysis and wargaming systems as a potential decision support system. He analyzed the use of such systems and one in particular, to be used by key decision-makers in group decisions and crisis decision management. LCDR Siddons concluded that such systems should be used for staff analytic support but not by key decision makers or even in the command centers where real-world decisions are being made. Associate Professor Tritten was the advisor for this thesis and Associate Professor Roberts was second reader. Distribution of this thesis will be made shortly.

A third thesis is currently being prepared. This thesis will deal with an examination of the process of net assessments and how they fit into the overall strategic planning process. This thesis will be written by LT Anthony Konecny and is expected to be completed by December 1988. Associate Professor Tritten is the advisor for this thesis and Associate Professor Whitt will be the second reader. It is anticipated that the thesis will be used as a text for the American National Security Objectives and Net Assessment seminar, NS 4251, to be taught by Associate Professor Tritten during the Winter Quarter of academic year 1989.

Questions Raised

(1) Education at Military or Civilian Schools?

One of the first questions that is raised about educating officers in such a manner is whether or not strategic planning or strategic management education should take place at a civilian or military school. A continual topic for discussion with the Navy is whether NPS should even be in the business of political-military education or whether officers requiring such education can receive a better education at a civilian school. Obviously intelligence programs must be taught at a government school since most of the course materials are classified. At the other end of the spectrum, the area studies and international organizations and negotiations programs are found at numerous excellent civilian schools.

Until last year, the strategic planning curriculum was identical to that found in better civilian schools. Due to recent changes, however, NPS arguably has the most innovative and dynamic strategic planning program in the United States. Although many aspects of nuclear strategic planning can be found to some degree at civilian universities, the depth of the nuclear side of this curriculum and the bulk of the general strategic planning program is not, and cannot, be duplicated at a civilian school.

For example, civilian schools do not have faculty that have experience in general strategic planning aspects that the Navy desires cultivated in our students; e.g. war planning. NPS

offers faculty that have had unique in-government strategic planning experience that cannot be duplicated by those not in uniform. Science, engineering, and business schools all suggest that their faculty have experience tours so that they will have an appreciation for the art of the possible as well as normative desires. Due to the nature of classified military strategic planning, civilians, even those in government service, simply do not participate in some of the key aspects of joint planning - a key to understanding the conduct of war.

Some of the other advantages which NPS offers over civilian schools are: a faculty and student body that share the same interest in Navy relevant education and concern for performance after the degree; the ability to easily mix technical/engineering courses with policy courses in our own department (this is crucial in our intelligence program and cannot be duplicated at the Defense Intelligence College); the ability to conduct instruction and perform research at the classified level (including Special Compartmented Information); attention to the special needs of students en route to specific countries; responsiveness to the detailing problem - i.e. we can take students onboard four times a year (many schools only admit students once a year); ability to guarantee that courses will be taught (especially critical for the area studies programs); ability to manipulate admissions standards by allowing students to take prerequisites; and unique ability to tailor the courses taught to be responsive to the needs of sponsors.

A frequently overlooked advantage of military education for military strategic planners is that when civilian schools political science departments teach strategic planning, they tend to focus on only international or national political or social science aspects. The DoD has a need for planners that can address planning at the regional or CinC level as well as the functional level. For example, each CinC and each of the major functional procurement offices at the Washington Headquarters have planners. Finding a civilian school that would be capable of addressing the politico-military planning needs of naval aviation would be difficult.

One of the criticisms levied at NPS is that its conservative student body and generally conservative faculty do not offer the students an opportunity to view the broad cross-section of political views in the nation. This problem can be overcome with participation of outsiders at NPS. For example, during the past Spring quarter, faculty from NPS were invited to the University of California at Santa Cruz (UCSC) where they gave a variety of guest lectures to political science classes. In turn, UCSC faculty and students were invited to the capstone seminar in strategic planning. The interaction was extremely beneficial to all the participants, especially the naval officers who otherwise may have not been exposed in the classroom to biases likely to be found amongst the generally liberal faculty and student body of UCSC. This exchange will be encouraged in the future.

(2) Who is to do strategic management/planning?

The Navy is biased to having serious strategic planning done by in-house personnel; preferably those in uniform. The Navy does have outside "experts" which are brought into the system from time to time but once those "experts" have left, complete planning and execution is done by uniformed officers. Many flag officers distrust civilian think tanks (even the Center for Naval Analyses) and defense contractors.

On the other hand, OSD appears to be biased in the opposite direction. OSD ad hoc, study groups, and Blue Ribbon panels abound. Certainly final decisions are made by those in office but participation by groups appears to be the norm to the point that the active duty military officer's role in OSD may be reduced to management of contracts rather than doing actual strategic planning. This method is an acceptable one for doing government business but affects the quality of the training or education that DoD should then give to its strategic planners.

To best answer the question of who should do strategic planning involves decisions on where that planning is to be done. If war planning is done at the CinC staff level, it is probably best done with military personnel in the lead. Some CinCs, however, probably cannot do their planning in the absence of participation of other non-military agencies, or Allied governments, and the private sector. For example, serious planning by Transportation Command must involve more than just the military personnel involved. Even planning for execution by the Strategic Air Command benefits from contract support.

Can the government do serious strategic planning in the absence of involvement with the private sector? If industry is to be involved, how can this be done without conflict of interest? There is a definite bias by some personnel in uniform to keep strategic planning divorced from government contracting types that are perceived as having only an interest in turning a profit. Tough conflict of interest laws discourage a strong interaction between contractors and government employees.

Some of the best strategic planning minds in the country are outside of government. To think that strategic planning can be done without the active participation of the private sector is to deprive the government of a wealth of talent. Yet despite the reality of an active cooperation between the private sector and government at the highest levels of DoD, the services have taught strategic planning from the perspective of the JSPS; it is all done from the inside.

The myth is then perpetuated by case studies and textbooks that ignore the contribution of the private sector. War college curricula focus on "military" strategy and rarely address concepts found in the Harvard Business Review.

There will always be a need for in-house planners due to the use of certain types of sensitive classified material, and the limitations on the release of war plans and actual war planning concepts. Since it is the military that must execute war plans, which are strategic plans, then in-house personnel must be able

to bridge the gap between military capabilities and political desires.

Is there a role for strategic planning/management any more at the military service level or should all war planning be done by allied organizations, the CINCs and JCS? This is a bit more difficult. The services must train, educate, and designate strategic planners that wear their uniforms but war planning is done above the service level.

If we shift all programming planning to the CINCs, JCS, and OSD, then do we have the same problem in programming? How do diversified corporations handle similar problems? Our initial efforts reveal that most major corporations cannot and do not do corporate level strategic planning of the type that we are talking about being required for DoD. They do, however, have extremely good strategic planning cells at the company level.

(3) Should strategic planning be done all the time or in spurts?

If done all the time, where do you start? With the goals of the organization, the threat, the resources available? Our research to date reveals no real consensus on how to start the planning effort. Obviously there are some logical starting points for different types of organizations.

For war planners, the logical starting point is by assessing available resources. For programming planners, the logical starting point is desired goals but often, we have found, the actual starting point will be current resources and some sense of

the share of the whole. The threat as a starting point is often the focus of corporate strategic planners or politico-military planners that are fixated on the single threat of the Soviet Union.

If strategic planning is done all the time, how can those line organizations in the system take it seriously? One of the failings of the JSPS is that it is so bureaucratic and regularized that creative thinking is neither appreciated nor desired. Some non-military organizations that we have seen have similar formalized planning systems but both researchers wondered if there was anyone in the operational side of the organization that took the plans seriously.

If strategic planning is not regularized but instead is done in spurts, what is the detection mechanism for the need for change? Often a signal is a changing threat. In the political-military world, changes in plans (and even the planning process) are a logical outgrowth of changes in political leadership in the country. Program planners change plans and the execution of plans once the budget process has run its full course. War planners change plans during the plan approval process and the integration of a single CinC's plans with those of others. Obviously war planners change the execution of plans during war.

Planning does not necessarily mean that plans (or even operations) will be successfully completed. Poor planning can hurt both the creation of a plan and execution. The inter-war years provide excellent case studies of poor analysis (estimates

of strategic bombing damage following World War I) that were perpetuated and resulted in faulty plans, poor recommendations for programs, poor political decisions, and poor execution of strategies.

Other British inter-war examples, however, demonstrate that good planning can be done at the inter-agency level. Actions taken by industry, the Royal Navy, and the Ministry of Defense before the outbreak of hostilities indicate that pre-war preparation can occur. In each case of a critical decision, however, an external threat signal was sent and caused a revision of planning estimates.

Forecasting the future is obviously difficult in the social sciences. Our research indicates that the major agencies charged with such tasks within the DoD, the intelligence services, are too narrowly focused on military matters to provide adequate advise to the Secretary. Emphasis appears to be needed in the full range of methodologies available for exploration of alternative futures. Corporate strategic planners seem to have a much broader horizon for considering alternative futures. This may be due to the economic incentives to do so. This leads us back to the reality that if the private sector is doing the serious work in futures, then government strategic planning must involve these people. We intend to make intelligence and forecasting a major chapter in the final technical report.

The gathering of data on one's own capabilities is another issue that is related to strategic planning. The inability of

DoD to have agreed upon data bases of its own forces is shocking. Programmers desire capability assessments to reflect those called for in systems specifications. War planners must have realistic assessments of own force capabilities.

Each of the services is guilty in this area. Air Force estimates for manned bomber penetration have always been questioned by outsiders. The kill rates that each U.S. submarine must attain against Soviet combined arms forces in "bastions" are higher than most outside analysts are willing to concede. The ability of ground forces to hold turf in Europe has been politicized to the point that models exist to support anyone's biases.

An asymmetry found in Soviet planning is that they take military history quite seriously and use it as the object of study for both strategies, operations, and tactics, but also to validate pre-war estimates for force capabilities. It appears that military history will never be supported in such a manner by academic institutions within the U.S. and if such efforts are desired by the government, they will likely have to be funded by the public sector.

The researchers discovered that the inability to gather information on one's own forces is shared by the private sector. Long-range strategic planning by all firms that we have visited tends to be limited to divisions and minimal at the corporate level. It appears that just as the services are in competition with each other, divisions vie for resources within corporations making corporate level planning very difficult. The Commerce

Department shares this frustration with their inability to gather data on the capabilities of U.S. (and allied) firms that would need to be mobilized during war. Some NDER members have suggested that the government simply use Chamber of Commerce data.

Initial Observations

Our analysis thus far leads us to structure the concept of strategic management in four main areas, each of which builds on the other:

(1) Thinking: Much "thinking" passes as strategic planning and management. The emphasis is on "thinking grand thoughts" or conceptualizing in a broad macro sense. The basic techniques for strategic thinking are expert opinion and the delphi technique. Expert opinion is available to virtually everyone; i.e. books such as former President Richard Nixon's new work 1999 or Zbigniew Brzezinski's Game Plan. These are examples of experts who have a clear vision of the future, the problem, and naturally some recommended solution, and are willing to share it with the public for the price of a book. Obviously there will always be a place for this (authors, consultants, & politicians) but merely thinking out a problem is not enough.

(2) Analysis: Again, much of what is called strategic planning or management is really analysis. Strategic analysis emphasizes alternatives and the consequences of alternative courses of action. As we move from strategic thinking into strategic analysis, we start to use modern analytic tools instead

of only simple expert judgment to develop alternative futures, alternative courses of action, and consequences. Cross-impact matrices are created to look at the relationship of variables. Simple trend extrapolation is used to predict short-term futures. Scenario building can be used as a stand-alone methodology or be used as an input for games and simulations which help analysts in prediction and sensitivity and contingency analysis.

Some examples of strategic analysis are found in three of the student reports: the B-36 vs USS United States, Discriminate Deterrence, National Security Strategy of the U.S., and Sea Plan 2000. The distinction between strategic analysis and strategic planning is that in strategic analysis, there is a lack of a specific plan for actual action by the parties concerned.

(3) Planning: Planning is an exercise in thinking and analysis that leads to the actual creation of a plan of action. This planning can be done on a number of different levels: short-term planning, long-range planning and nuclear planning, all of which are used in DoD; strategic planning or strategic management which are used in business and industry. Much of what passes for planning education in civilian political science departments is actually military strategy or strategic nuclear. There is a whole world of strategic planning, however, found in business schools that is rarely addressed by political scientists.

This is surprising since the Soviet Union is the ultimate planning state. Some would argue that we in the United States

would increase the efficiency of our military forces if we would adopt the Soviet model for defense planning. How many of us, however, would be willing to change our way of life, our free enterprise system, or our government in order to accommodate the changes necessary to increase efficiency in planning? Despite all their accomplishments in the planning area, fortunately the Soviets are terrible at execution.

With the passage of Goldwater-Nichols Act, recent attention has been on "joint" military planning. Congress has lead the military services into a call for improved planning but the focus again remains on military issues and not on the creation of a national plan in peacetime. Interestingly, emphasis for such planning comes from experts, usually associated with political causes. Our previously mentioned books 1999 and Game Plan actually contain comprehensive plans of action for the management of the competitive inter-state relationship.

There is a long history of attempts at or long-range planning by the military. Between the wars, the services cooperated and developed war plans that formed the basis for the campaigns that were fought in the Pacific. With the creation of the DoD, each of the services undertook a review of their roles and missions and each set up some type of a planning group. Our focus thus far has been on planning efforts by the JCS, the Navy and Air Force, and the other two services will be looked at during the coming years.

Also, much of what passes for planning in the military actually concerns itself with programming and budgetary issues. The services appear to be very comfortable with the fact that their Washington headquarters staffs are devoted to a great deal to support of the budget. Planning meetings generally never mention the name of another nation on the face of the earth.

Strategic planning and management by private corporations, on the other hand, is very focused upon the competition. The military has used corporate methods, from time to time, but the legacy of the McNamara experience has soured the services on borrowing from industry. Recently the DoD has mandated another attempt to borrow concepts from the private sector with the attempted use of competitive strategies.

Military planning often takes place in an inter-agency context, often with the DoD not necessarily taking the lead role. Documentation on the inter-agency process is difficult to obtain but it appears that we should be able to use the Graduated Mobilization Response plan, and efforts to stockpile strategic minerals and oil. These plans suits our study well since they are tied to the ability to fight and sustain war and have a distinct international context.

(4) Strategic Management: Strategic management as we have defined in the introduction of this report is the management of the total organization or system. While thinking, analysis, and planning are important components, strategic management also includes the execution phase where the plan is actually

implemented and monitored. Interestingly, the existing JSPS is an excellent case study of strategic management since all of the elements are there. Unfortunately, many have argued that this system produces plans that although they are often executed, are not necessarily in the best interests of the U.S.

Military planners are not comfortable with the term strategic management yet perform most of the elements required; i.e. they think through the execution phase of the plan. Despite this, strategic management has not been taught to strategic planning students. The focus on strategic planning education often includes the execution phase but often from a historical perspective and not necessarily from that of the social scientist.

There is a sub-set of the military planning community that does not necessarily address successful execution of the plan. This was a major criticism of the military under the Carter Presidency; defense of the United States was viewed as being best achieved by deterrence which in turn was achieved by the ability to punish aggression. The military and their political leaders were criticized for failing to think through what is required if deterrence fails? The war plan itself was thought to be the finished product.

Under the Reagan administration, the military clearly addressed the execution of war plans; leading in turn to criticism over plans to fight and win nuclear wars. To mollify critics, the Commander-in-Chief himself declared that there could

be no winners in a nuclear war. Yet military planners needed to think through all the options so that they would be able to offer sound military advise if ever required.

Strategic management is also successful in the programming side of military planning. Here the DoD is executing plans successfully every day of the year. All of the elements required of strategic management are found on the programming side but the lack of crossover to the policy side is astonishing. The services do a good job in educating future program managers in concepts of strategic management but generally without the political-military background that would let them understand why forces are required in the first place.

The programming side of the military tends to view the pure politico-military planner as operating in an unconstrained dream world whose function is to create the wish list for what they would like if they could have it all. The politico-military planner does in fact create such lists, but another group of them works solely on current or near term plans that are totally dependent upon the output of the programming process. The disconnect appears to be in the front end - between determining requirements and creating programs.

Case studies of successful strategic management that we will use for this study will probably include the early Navy General Board, the post-war Marshall Plan, PPBS, and NASA. We may look at a few foreign examples of successful strategic management during the next few years; dependent upon the outcome of those

plans. The focus of the inquiry will be on what elements were present in those nations that could successfully manage an overall defense plan that are not present in the U.S.

Efforts Planned for Fiscal Year 1989

Fiscal year 1989 will have the investigators refining case studies, looking for parallels in historical cases to today's situations, reviewing lessons from industry to see how they have fared when applied to government (PPBS and competitive strategies will deserve special attention). The major question is whether lessons from industry can be actually applied to DoD or just used for education?

The above will form the basis of the technical report textbook which we will develop over the next two years. The basic outline that we have adopted for the first draft of our technical report is contained in Figure 5 (comments are desired from the reader):

Figure 5

TECHNICAL REPORT/TEXTBOOK DRAFT OUTLINE

Introduction - purpose of project and report
- definition of terms

Part I - The Problem
Snapshot Description of Existing System
Criticism

Part II - Strategic Management
Thinking
- Tools and techniques
- Case studies
Analysis
- Tools and techniques
- Case studies
Planning
- Tools and techniques
- Case studies
Strategic Management/Strategic Planning
- Tools and techniques
- Case studies

Part III - Special Issues
Using Business Models for DoD
The Role of Resources
The Threat
Goals

Part IV - Prescription
Who Should do Strategic Planning?
When Should Strategic Planning be Done?

Bibliography

The investigators will look to business and the social sciences to ascertain to what extent alternative models and principles from these areas can be applied to DoD strategic management. Recognizing that there are significant differences in DoD that make direct applications difficult, the investigators also will examine to what extent these models and principles, if they do transfer, need to be modified or amended before they can be applied to public sector strategic management. The objective

of this phase will be to thoroughly investigate alternative models currently used in the private sector and in the social sciences to determine what can be applied to an organization that is not only structurally very different, but must contend with a very highly unpredictable, national and global socio-political environment.

Fall Quarter FY-89: Professor Tritten will continue research on current historical DoD case studies. Research on intelligence materials will be folded into the project. Professor Roberts teaches MN 4105 and further refines student reports. Professors Tritten and Whitt will supervise one thesis that will be used for this project.

Winter Quarter FY-89: Professor Roberts will continue research on strategic management in the public sector and the fold in research on social science models into the project. Professor Tritten will teach a revised Net Assessment seminar, NS 4251.

Spring Quarter FY-89: Professor Tritten will teach the revised seminar in strategic planning, NS 4230, for the second time and revise the interim technical reports. Professor Roberts will teach the revised seminar on strategic management, MN 4105, for first group of NSA students. As a payback for her services, the NSA department will provide one faculty member to teach a basic organizational theory course for management students. NSA Programs curricular review by OP-06.

Summer Quarter FY-89: Professor Roberts will continue research on strategic management in the public sector and will meet with sponsors and continue interviews in Washington. Professor Tritten will review student reports and refine a revised technical report.

Expected Efforts During Fiscal Year 1990

The final stage of the study will be to determine what forms of strategic management might be applied to DoD and to discuss the application of gaming, simulation, and other techniques that can assist decision-makers in dealing with uncertainty and the future. The final stage will include the preparation of a final draft technical report summarizing all these issues. The project is expected to be a three-year effort and will include the team-teaching of a strategic planning course at NPS after each stage of research.

Fall Quarter FY-90: Professor Tritten will continue research and outline the final draft technical report.

Winter Quarter FY-90: Professor Roberts will continue research on public sector strategic management and its applications to DoD, making inputs to the final draft technical report.

Spring Quarter FY-90: Draft of final technical report will be prepared and sent to sponsors and other interested parties. Strategic management and strategic planning courses taught and case studies revised. Sponsor to visit NPS and meet with PIs and students.

Summer Quarter FY-90: Professors Tritten and Roberts on research to prepare final technical report after receipt of sponsor's comments on draft. Submission of final technical report and distribution.

IV. SUMMARY OF OUR CHALLENGING MISSION

To put into perspective what has been described above, we would like to leave the reader with a series of questions. In addition to getting some feedback from you and using these questions as a point of our discussion, these questions will give you some understanding of the enormity of our task:

We can teach the principles of strategic management but how do we teach our students to apply them to DOD? Current Navy efforts in this area (OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5000), for example, acknowledges that long-range planning is critically important for the future, while it recognizes that decentralized long-range planning is the norm. And from our perspective, what is currently in place is focused on specific programs not on the overall strategic management of the Navy as a whole organization.

Perhaps we should concern ourselves with strategically managing even smaller and smaller organizational units. After all, business and industry rarely and successfully conduct strategic management at the corporate level, but instead tend to manage strategically at the divisional level, if at all. But what should that level be? If we select smaller and smaller organizations or organizational units, do we not violate the very principles that started this effort in the first place -- greater integration and coordination of the whole defense effort through some kind of strategic management process?

Thus, we are caught in a major dilemma. How can we apply strategic management principles to a system that is very

decentralized, made up of semi-autonomous units which ideally should coordinate their efforts, but practically because of their size (and their separate traditions and the American culture which insists on shared power among the major branches of government) probably will have an enormous difficulty in doing so? How and with what means and mechanisms can we develop an integrated Defense policy? What will it take to get us there?

We are beginning our efforts at NPS by educating students to the nature of the problem and introducing them to the skills and tools they will need in the strategic management process. In the meantime, we invite the reader to help us develop some solutions to this thorny and critical problem area in which we, as citizens and taxpayers, all have a stake.

It is important to note, however, that this reform effort is not being done by contractors outside of system but by government employees who have a legitimate role to play in strategic planning and strategic management. Implementing the reform recommendations will be that much easier and doubly so since the parties who will make the recommendations will also be those who have to execute them.

If any readers have suggestions on the content of this report, the direction that the project is taking, or would like to be included in future efforts, please contact either of the two investigators:

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APPENDIX A

Catalog Description of NPS Strategic Planning Courses

NS 0810 THESIS RESEARCH (0 - 0).

Students conducting thesis research will enroll in this course.

NS 1010 ELEMENTARY STATISTICS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
(0 - 0).

Preparatory data analysis programmed text course offered via Office of Continuing Education.

NS 3000 MILITARY HISTORY, WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD (4 - 0).

Study of history of war since 1815. Course emphasizes the connection between the events of war, strategy and policy in the international system of states. The class compares the military experience of the leading world powers, seeking to demonstrate how war has become total in the modern age. The different national experiences with policy, strategy, operations and tactics form the central focus of the course. Students are expected to prepare an individual project on a selected problem of the history of war for presentation to the class.

NS 3012 FORECASTING AND RESEARCH METHODS FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING
(4 - 0)

Survey of the methods and techniques used in conducting research, hypothesis testing and forecasting. The focus is on those national security issues related to the strategic planning and international negotiations process. Topics include policy research design, generation and statistical analysis of data, and forecasting techniques such as trend analysis and extrapolation, cross-impact matrix analysis, probabilistic forecasting, structuring techniques, delphi expert judgment and genius forecasting, scenario building, and simulation modeling to include war gaming. PREREQUISITE: NS 1010

NS 3022 THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING (4 - 0)

Survey of concepts, processes and historical developments which define the present and future international environment for strategic planning, international negotiations, and intelligence. This course will utilize the systems approach to integrate the strategic planning effort at the institutional level with regional and global factors. These factors include actors interactions, and environmental components such as technology, ideologies, value systems, geopolitics, and ecology.

NS 3030 AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY/DEFENSE ORGANIZATION
(4 - 0)

An institutional and functional analysis of the national and international factors which shape U.S. defense policy. Attention in the course is focused on two major areas: 1) the decision making process, including the legislative-executive budgetary process, as well as the influence of bureaucratic politics and interest group participation upon defense decisions; 2) the problems of strategic choice, including security

assistance, threat analysis, net assessment, deterrence theory, and limited war.

NS 3050 MARITIME STRATEGY (4 - 0).

A policy-oriented analysis of the maritime and naval components of our national military strategy. Introduces to the student the relationship of war at sea and other uses of the sea to what happens ashore. Introduces to the student the use of maritime assets for political gain and the impact of technology on maritime roles, missions, and capabilities. Students are expected to prepare an individual project for presentation to the class. PREREQUISITE: NS 3000 or permission of Instructor.

NS 3230 STRATEGIC PLANNING AND U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.
(4 - 0).

The focus of this course will be on long term strategic planning and will include such topics as: Strategic Goal Analysis, national and transnational power assessment, analysis of the decision making and administrative processes at the national level, indigenous constraints on the policy process, forecasting and future research techniques and the application of the concepts of strategic planning to the national defense effort.

PREREQUISITE: NS 3030.

NS 3250 DEFENSE RESOURCES ALLOCATION. (4 - 1).

A presentation of the concepts, principles and methods of defense resources allocation as they pertain to planning, programming, budgeting and related activities. Emphasis is placed on the analytical aspects of decision making drawn from the disciplines of management theory, economics and quantitative analysis. The laboratory sessions include problems and case studies in which the concepts and methods are applied to illustrative situations.

NS 3280 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. (4 - 0).

An interdisciplinary course which covers both the technology and political influences of nuclear weapon systems with the foreign policies of the major powers and the political blocs from 1945 to the present.

NS 3400 DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.
(4 - 0).

An examination of the role of domestic factors shaping Soviet international conduct, including historical influences, ideology, political and economic systems, nationalities and political culture.

NS 3410 SOVIET NATIONAL SECURITY. (4 - 0).

A follow up course to NS 3400. Examination of the evolution of Soviet national security policy. Introductory part of the course deals with pre-World War II roots of Soviet national security policy and evolution of Soviet national security decision-making. The main part of the course deals with Soviet national security policy from the end of World War II to the present, with special emphasis on US-Soviet relations, relations between the USSR and China, and Soviet use of force in Eastern Europe and the Third

World (Middle East, Angola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan).PREREQUISITE:
NS 3400 or consent of instructor.

NS 3450 SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY. (4 - 0).

Examination of international and external factors conditioning Soviet military doctrine and strategy and their development through the Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras and beyond. Emphasis is on contemporary Soviet strategic concepts and strategy: surprise and deception, war-fighting capabilities, external role of the Soviet armed forces, strategy for nuclear war, Warsaw Treaty Organization strategy, and Soviet naval strategy in the Third World.

NS 3452 THE NAVY IN SOVIET STRATEGY. (4 - 0).

Examination of the roles played by the Soviet Navy, Merchant Marine, fishing fleet, and Oceanological establishment in securing the objectives of the Soviet Government. Topics include: geographic factors affecting Soviet ocean strategies; non-naval strategy trends; international and domestic factors affecting post-1953 naval strategy, development of Soviet naval warfare capabilities; doctrinal and functional analysis of post-1953 trends in naval strategy; command structure; personnel training; law of the sea positions; U.S.-Soviet naval interaction. PREREQUISITE: NS 3450 or permission of Instructor and SECRET clearance.

NS 3902 MODERN REVOLUTION AND POLITICAL TERRORISM. (4 - 0).

Study of the general historical framework of modern revolution to include systematical analysis of the development of modern revolutionary situations. Examination of the more important revolutions of modern times, including study of the historical events, testing of the methods of systematic analysis, with emphasis on revolutionary tactics, e.g., political terrorism.

NS 3960 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LAW OF WAR. (4 - 0).

An introduction to the principles of international law including origins, sources, sovereignty, states, territory, jurisdiction, persons, treaties, settlement of disputes, and the Law of the Sea. The law of war is analyzed as it is to be observed and enforced by the Armed Forces of the United States. Special attention is paid to the 1949 Geneva Convention, the Navy's Law of Naval Warfare and the Army's Law of Land Warfare.

NS 4220 THREAT ANALYSIS AND THE CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. (4 - 0)

An appreciation for other threats to U.S. interests and those of its allies including; Muslim fundamentalism, the Arab/Israeli conflict the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, threats to the Pacific Rim including Philippine insurgency, North Korea, Vietnam, Central and South American instability, and Africa. Functional threats will also be examined; technological breakthroughs, chemical and biological warfare, as well as the military uses of space. Graded on a Pass/Fail basis only.

NS 4230 SEMINAR IN STRATEGIC PLANNING. (4 - 0).

Advanced study in the concept and methods of long-range defense forecasting, strategic planning, strategic analysis, and strategic management with respect to the military services, the JCS, DoD and their interaction with the Department of State, NSC, President, and Congress. Students will research and report on major strategic issue/planning process which has or has had a significant long-term implications. PREREQUISITE: Secret clearance and NS 3030, 3230, 3250, 4261, & 4500 or permission of instructor.

NS 4251 AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND NET ASSESSMENT. (4 - 0).

Comparative analysis of trends in U.S. and Soviet security policies, military forces, manpower, and capabilities. Special attention is paid to familiarizing students with original source material and major elements in current controversial national security issues. Topics covered include nuclear capabilities and doctrine, BMD and air defense, civil defense, combined arms employment, NATO Warsaw Pact military balance, naval forces, and trends in the U.S. and Soviet economies, especially as they may affect the allocation of resources to defense. PREREQUISITE: TOP SECRET clearance with eligibility for SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE information.

NS 4261 SURVEY OF STRATEGIC STUDIES. (4 - 0).

An extensive survey of the classical and contemporary literature on strategic thinking: national objectives and strategic alternatives; deterrence, counterforce, arms control, counter insurgency, compellence; components and rules of the international strategic system; arms competitions, nuclear proliferation, terrorism. Student projects on current strategic problems are a major component of the course. PREREQUISITE: NS 3020.

NS 4280 ADVANCED TOPICS IN NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND DETERRENCE. (4 - 0).

A follow-up course to NS 3280 that examines advanced issues in nuclear strategy, strategic and crisis stability, and deterrence. In addition to advanced theoretical issues of deterrence, this course will specifically investigate the role and importance of nuclear force planning and strategy formulation in deterrence, stability, and foreign policy implementation. Some of this analysis will be done using both static measurement models and dynamic computer nuclear exchange modeling. PREREQUISITE: NS 3280 or permission of the Instructor; SECRET clearance.

NS 4451 ADVANCED TOPICS IN SOVIET NAVAL AFFAIRS. (4 - 0).

Advanced study and research in Soviet naval and maritime affairs. Topics include: decision-making processes, scenarios, warfare capabilities and support systems, missions methodology, gaming, and U.S. Soviet naval interactions. PREREQUISITE: NS 3452, TOP SECRET clearance with eligibility for SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE information, or permission of Instructor.

NS 4500 SEMINAR IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST. (4 - 0).

An advanced study of the underlying assumptions and objectives of American security and foreign policy. The core of the course is an in-depth analysis of the American national interest in the international context. Students are required to write a major seminar paper on American national interests in a specific country or region.

NS 4950 SEMINAR IN ARMS CONTROL AND NATIONAL SECURITY. (4 - 0).

An analysis of international negotiation processes as related to the control of armaments, including a review of the history of modern arms control efforts, examination of the domestic political context of arms limitation, the implications of international law relevant to treaty negotiations, ratification and enforcement, the intellectual contributions of scientists to the development of arms control theory, and a review of selected substantive issues with respect to security concerns, verification capabilities and compliance measures. PREREQUISITES: NS 3450 and 3900 or consent of Instructor and SECRET clearance.

MN 4105 MANAGEMENT POLICY. (4 - 0).

Study and analysis of complex managerial situations requiring comprehensive integrated decision making. Topics include operational and strategic planning, policy formulation, executive control, environmental adaptation, and management of change. Case studies in both the public and private sectors are used. PREREQUISITE: Open only to students in the final quarter of an Administrative Science curriculum, Computer Systems Management or Telecommunications Systems Management.

APPENDIX B

Assistant Professor Jim Tritten
M & W 1010-1200 Root Hall 228

QIII AY-88
Spring

Seminar in Strategic Planning NS 4230 (4-0)

Course Description: Advanced study in the concept and methods of long-range defense planning and analysis, particularly with respect to iterative aggregation and synthesis in the Military Departments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of State, the National Security Council/White House, and the Congress. Students are expected to research and report on a major strategic issue/strategic planning process/case study which has/has a significant long-term impact. PREREQUISITE: SECRET clearance and NS 3230 or permission of Instructor.

Course Objectives: By the end of the course, the student will demonstrate that he comprehends and can apply his knowledge of general strategic planning by an analysis of major issues in strategic planning and selected case studies. Student will demonstrate that he has mastered the differences between the terms strategic planning, strategic management, strategic nuclear, strategic non-nuclear, and strategy, and between planning for programming, war planning, and execution of plans, and between declaratory planning and real planning.

Clearance Requirement: The course is taught at the unclassified level. Certain of the case studies materials and a seminar discussions of actual war planning will involve classified material; hence a SECRET clearance is required.

Texts Purchased by Student:

- (1) Zbigniew Brzezinski, Game Plan: How to Conduct the U.S.-Soviet Contest, 1986
- (2) Perry Smith, Jerrold Allen, John Stewart, & F. Douglas Whitehouse, Creating Strategic Vision: Long-Range Planning for National Security, 1987
- (3) William Ascher & William H. Overholt, Strategic Planning Forecasting: Political Risk and Economic Opportunity, 1983

Texts Provided by Instructor:

- (1) Carl H. Builder, The Army in Strategic Planning: Who Shall Bell the Cat?, 1987
- (2) Joint Staff Officer's Guide - 1986, AFSC Pub 1
- (3) James L. George, Robert E. Sheridan, Francis J. West, Michael E. Sherman, Review of USN Long-Range Planning, CRM 85-69/July 1985

Recommended Texts Provided by Instructor (no readings assigned):

(1) National Security Strategy of the United States, January 1988

(2) Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, January 1988

Grade: Based upon in-class written assignments, classroom presentation and participation, written assignments, and the seminar paper.

Written Assignments: Two-page think pieces will be required throughout the course in addition to the seminar paper. These are to be original thought with no footnotes or additional research required. Occasionally papers will be required that are to be written in the classroom.

Seminar Paper: A major research paper is to be written that addresses a specific case study in successful/failed strategic planning/strategic management. The objective of the paper is to identify and describe the system used for planning and the system of execution/implementation of that plan and to then identify those elements of the planning/management system that were present and resulted in success/failure. The papers must analyze and not merely describe; i.e. a descriptive paper will be returned as incomplete. The annotated bibliography will be considered in the grade assigned to the paper. Papers should adhere to the following outline:

I - Background description of the international or national context of events at the time, what was it that was being planned, how did the planning process end (with a published study/execution of plan etc.), and if implemented, was the strategic management effort generally successful (or not). (2 pages maximum)

II - Description of the strategic planning/management system. This should not be an especially detailed description of the substance of the issues being planned but rather a description of the system for planning. (3 pages maximum).

III - Key assumptions made by key personnel or in the plan and constraints on the planning/management system. Were there common goals and objectives that all parties agreed to? (3 pages maximum).

IV - Analysis of the key elements of the plan/execution system that were crucial to success/failure. (Open ended size)

V - Annotated Bibliography (Open ended size)

Due NLT Friday 17 June 1988

Class Schedule

Monday 28 March - Course Introduction

- Course overview and requirements presented by instructor
- Seminar paper topics discussed
- Instructor provided texts passed out
- Case Study in Strategic Planning: videotape Beyond War
- In class exercise: outline of Beyond War strategic plan (handwritten answers to the following questions to be turned in at end of class period with xerox copies returned to students to be used in at-home analysis)
 - (1) What is the problem?
 - (2) What is the goal of the Beyond War group?
 - (3) How does the group expect to reach their goal?
 - (4) What is the expected end result of Beyond War's efforts?

Wednesday 30 March - Basics of Long-range Political-Military Planning

- Readings: Smith pp. xv-22, Builder pp. 1-11, Brzezinski pp. xiii-29
- Paper due: Analysis of (compare and contrast) the political-military futures as advocated by Beyond War and Brzezinski: can we plan for either of these? Paper to parallel class discussion.
- Class discussion: Students will lead discussion of their viewing of the Beyond War videotape and Brzezinski relative to: (1) the future seen by each, (2) the methodologies used by each to identify their versions of the future, and (3) how realistic are each's strategic plan? Is the U.S. in a zero-sum or non-zero sum game with the USSR? Students/faculty from UC Santa Cruz have been invited to participate in discussion.

Monday 4 April - Methodologies for Long-range Planning & Forecasting Part I

- Readings: Smith pp. 49-92, Ascher pp. xi-93
- Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on (1) the role of the analyst in support of political-military policy makers, (2) the types of methodologies that are available to help staffs and decision-makers, and (3) elements of a basic strategy.
- Students will select their seminar research paper topics by this date

Wednesday 6 April - Methodologies for Long-range Planning & Forecasting Part II

- Readings: Ascher pp. 94-157
- Paper due: Analysis of all the types of methodologies for developing alternative futures likely to be of interest to strategic planners in the DoN/DoD with strengths and weaknesses of each method highlighted and likelihood that anyone in the DoN/DoD would pay attention to each. Paper to be in the form of a matrix. Use all methodologies found in texts.
- Class discussion: Student views of paper topic and overall efforts to reduce uncertainty and aid decision-makers.

Monday 11 April - Alternative Futures

- Readings: Brzezinski pp. 30-144
- Class discussion: Students to lead discussion on how to identify the future that we plan for. To include inability to identify all political variables, inability to describe an international system, inability to predict, and need to plan anyway. How might varying methodologies help predict?
- In class exercise: students will outline a Soviet scenario for a general war or a specific campaign to be used in a war game.

Wednesday 13 April - Prescriptive Strategic Planning

- Readings: Smith pp. 93-133, Brzezinski pp. 145-250
- Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on what should American goals be in peacetime, crises, or war? Do goals derive from the threat, expected resources, or existing plans? Do we prepare for the worst/best/most likely case? Does answer vary in programming vs. war planning or declaratory vs. real planning?
- In class exercise: disarmament exercise.

Monday 18 April - Descriptive DoD Strategic Planning

- Readings: Joint Staff Officer's Guide chapters 5-7, 10
- Paper due: Analysis of how likely it is that the current or expected elements in the DoD forecasting and planning process are capable of providing good advice and a system for strategic planning/management to decision-makers. Paper is not to be descriptive.
- Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on how likely is it that decision-makers are well served by the current system? DRMEC faculty have been invited to participate in the discussion.

Wednesday 20 April - Problems with Present DoD Strategic Planning

- Readings: Ascher pp. 245-261, Smith pp. 23-48, Builder pp. 12-98, Norman Bailey & Stefan Halper, "National Security for Whom?"
- Discussion: Students will lead discussion on how we can integrate the needs of the varying multi-purpose organizations within the DoD and the realities of the American political system to have an effective long-range planning process.

Monday 25 April - War Planning

- Readings: Keith A. Dunn, "The Missing Link in Conflict Termination Thought" Strategy," LTG John Cushman, "Strategic Planning in the Military," SECDEF Statement to SASC 12 Jan 87, pp. 1-3, & Allan Millett, et. al., "The Effectiveness of Military Organizations"
- Paper due: What should the major goals be for the U.S. and USSR if they engage in a major war? Each geographic area of world must be covered and prioritized.
- Class discussion: Students will lead discussion on how to decide the goals for the U.S. in a major war with the USSR and how we should choose to allocate our military resources to the varying theaters of military operations. Is war termination a zero-sum or non-zero sum game?

- Wednesday 27 April - Business & Public Sector Strategic Planning
- Readings: LaRue Hosmer, "Introduction to Strategic Management," George pp. iii-iv & appendix D, Kenichi Ohmae The Mind of the Strategist pp. xi-xiii, p. 1-41, 76-88, 269-277, LTC Al Gropman "Long-range Planning," pp. 49-54, John Bryson & Robert Einsweiler, "Strategic Planning," John Bryson & William Roering, "Applying Private-Sector Strategic Planning in the Public Sector"
 - Guest lecturer: Associate Professor Nancy Roberts, Department of Administrative Sciences
 - Class discussion: What types of business and public sector planning concepts are applicable to the DoN/DoD and why are they applicable?

Monday 2 May - Research time for students

Wednesday 4 May - Research time for students

Monday 9 May - Student Presentations

- National Security Strategy published by White House
- Discriminate Deterrence report
- Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead discussion on role of line organizations and special blue-ribbon panels in strategic planning process.

Wednesday 11 May - Student Presentations

- McNamara era and the start of PPBS in DoD
- Competitive Strategies
- Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead discussion on likelihood of business models being successful within DoN/DoD in either programming or war planning.

Monday 16 May - Student Presentations

- Navy Long-range strategic planning
- Air Force Long-range strategic planning
- Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead discussion on role of service long-range planning efforts within context of overall Executive Branch/DoD efforts.

Wednesday 18 May - Strategic Management/Implementation

- Readings: John Bryson, "A Strategic Planning Process for Public & Non-profit Organizations," Richard Hamermesh, "The Forces Shaping Strategic Decision Making," and Thomas Wheelen & J. David Hunger, "Strategy Implementation," & "Evaluation and Control."
- Guest Lecturer: Associate Professor Nancy Roberts, Department of Administrative Sciences
- Class discussion: Implementing plans and necessary infrastructure

Monday 23 May - Student Presentations

- Navy General Board
- War Planning between WWI & WWII: the Rainbow Plans
- Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead discussion on key elements found in general strategic planning and war planning of the inter-war years.

Wednesday 25 May - Student Presentations

-Seaplan 2000

-The Maritime Strategy

-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead discussion on key elements in designing a general strategic plan for the Navy in recent years

Monday 30 May - Holiday/Research Time

Wednesday 1 June - Student Presentations

-NASA

-SST

-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead discussion on key elements in success/failures of these non-DoD cases.

Monday 6 June - Student Presentations

-The B-36/USS United States controversy

-Strategic mineral stockpiling

-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead discussion on key elements in success/failure of these cases.

Wednesday 8 June - Student Presentations

-Oil stockpiling

-Marshall Plan

-Class discussion: Two students presenting case studies will lead discussion on key elements in success/failure of these cases.

Friday 10 June - Wrap Up

-Readings: Berend Bruins, "Should Naval Officers be Strategists?", Businessweek "The New Breed of Strategic Planner," Henry Mintzberg, "Crafting Strategy," & Lincoln Bloomfield, "Anticipating the Future: Foreign Policy Planning"

-Class Discussion: Should naval officers be strategists?

-Guest participant: LTG/Dr. Robert Gard USA (Ret.), President of the Monterey Institute of International Studies

APPENDIX C

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MN 4105
FALL TERM 1989

PROFESSOR NANCY ROBERTS
OFFICE: IN 216
PHONE: 646-2742
OFFICE HOURS:
T & W 3-5 AND
BY APPOINTMENT

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE

I. COURSE MATERIALS:

John Bryson. Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988.

Philip Heymann. The Politics of Public Management. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987.

Quinn, J.B., Mintzberg, H. James, R.M. The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, and Cases. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1988.

Other materials handed out in class.

II. COURSE DESCRIPTION:

This course deals with the strategic management of the total enterprise. Strategic decisions are those that define the major areas of the firm's (or organization's) development and the allocation of resources to pursue strategic direction. This course deals with strategic management because we are concerned with both the determination of strategic direction and the management of the strategic process. Our central focus will be the problem identification, analysis, and action required by the general manager to deal with strategic issues.

Strategic management is more than analysis. To be sure, strategic analysis is a major part of this course. We will study several analytical techniques for positioning a firm or organization within a competitive environment. Strategic analyses are compounded by the trade-offs inherent in any situation. These trade-offs reflect the fact that organizations consist of many players with multiple, competing objectives. When dealing with these trade-offs, general managers must confront the judgmental issues involved in establishing organizational purpose and balancing economic and non-economic objectives.

Strategic management requires moving beyond analysis and trade-offs into the realm of strategic action. Once the analytical problem of selecting a strategy has been dealt with, we should know what to do. Knowing what to do, however, is only part of running an organization. (Some say it's the easy part.) Knowing how to execute the selected strategy is essential to

success. To the extent possible in each case, we will concern ourselves with the various combinations of systems (for example, information, control, reward, etc.), organization structures, and people necessary to execute a given strategy. We will test our ideas about the relationships between strategy and these other elements as we proceed through the course.

Our perspective in this course is that of the general manager whose responsibility is the long-term health of the entire organization. The key tasks involved in general management include the detection of and adaptation to environmental change, the procurement and allocation of resources, the integration of activities across subparts of the organizations, and, at the most senior levels, the determination of purpose and the setting of the organization's direction.

General managers, from our perspective, are managers who are in the position to make strategic decisions for the organization. Note that such managers need to have in-depth understanding of the generic problems in all the relevant functional areas. Furthermore, they must be able to deal with problems and issues at the level of the total organization and its relationships with relevant external environments.

Successful general managers are highly competent in problem identification and analysis and have a strong action orientation. One purpose of this course is to provide an environment which will allow you to develop these skills, while at the same time gaining a conceptual understanding of the complexity of the strategic manager's task.

Functional specialists can benefit from the general management perspective even though they may not be general managers. Every function's actions should be coordinated with the overall needs of the organization. In fact, functional specialists are the people on whom general managers often rely to implement their strategies. Since such functional managers can be prone to suboptimization problems, they too, need to understand the general manager's perspective.

III. OBJECTIVES:

In this course, "knowledge" has a more pragmatic meaning. Knowledge here is the ability or wisdom to take appropriate action in a changing reality, rather than a collection of facts about a static world. The course objectives therefore include:

1. Development and reinforcement of a general management point of view -- the capacity to view an organization from an overall perspective in the context of its environment.

2. Development of an understanding of fundamental concepts in strategic management: the levels and components of strategy; value creation; competitive analysis; and organizational evolution.

3. Integration of the knowledge gained in previous core courses and understanding of what part of that knowledge is useful to general managers.

4. Development of those skills and knowledge peculiar to general management and the general manager's job that have not been covered in previous functional courses.

5. Development of an awareness of the various impacts of external environmental forces on an organization's strategy.

6. Practice in distinguishing between basic causes of organization problems and attendant symptoms.

7. Practice in working out business strategies and implementation plans.

8. Development of habits of orderly, analytical thinking and skill in reporting conclusions effectively in both written and oral form.

9. Familiarity with some of the practical realities of running different types of organizations.

IV. ACCOMPLISHING THE OBJECTIVES: COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Like any general management situation, this course includes individual performance evaluation and feedback regarding your demonstrated ability to learn, apply, and expand on the materials that will be covered in class. These evaluations, selected to aid in reaching the course objectives, will be based on class participation and written work.

Class Participation

This course will be taught by the case method. (See note on the case method in Quinn). The case method requires that a student be present for and participate in class discussions in order to develop problem solving skills and to stimulate other forms of "learning". Therefore, I will expect you to participate actively in case discussions.

In a typical class, one or more students would be asked to start the class by answering a specific question or discussing a specific issue. Preparation of the case (including the assignment questions) should be sufficient to handle such a lead-off assignment. After a few minutes of initial analysis, we will open the discussion to the rest of the class. As a group, we will then try to build a complete analysis of the situation and address the problems and issues presented in the case. We will also spend time talking about the implementation of those recommendations and some of the complexities of effecting change in strategic management situations.

Most general managers spend very little time reading, and even less time writing reports. The vast majority of their interactions with others are verbal. For this reason, the development of verbal skills is given a high priority in this course. The classroom should be considered a laboratory in which you can test your ability to convince your peers of the correctness of your approach to complex problems and of your ability to achieve the desired results through the use of that approach. Some of the things that have an impact on effective class participation are the following:

1. Is the participant a good listener?
2. Are the points that are made relevant to the discussion? Are they linked to the comments of others?
3. Do the comments add to our understanding of the situation?
4. Do the comments show evidence of analysis of the case?
5. Does the participant distinguish among different kinds of data (that is, facts, opinions, beliefs, concepts, etc.)?
6. Is there a willingness to share?
7. Is there a willingness to be creative and to test new ideas, or are all comments "safe"? (For example, repetition of case facts without analysis and conclusions).
8. Is the participant willing to interact with other class members?
9. Do comments clarify and highlight the important aspects of earlier comments and lead to a clearer statement of the concepts being covered?

The questions above deal with the process of class participation. Of equal or greater concern is the content of what you say. As will be noted subsequently, class participation will be a major portion of your grade in this course.

Group Project.

Working in groups of _____, students will select one topic on which to write: The Navy Context; The JCS Context; The DoD Context; The Nasa Context; DoD and the Management of Change; Maritime Strategy; Competitive Strategy; and National Security Strategy. Your group is to prepare a written report (15 pages, double-spaced) that is to be turned in on the day of your class presentation. The report is to address the questions in the syllabus for that day.

Let us use the Navy Context as an example of what is required in the group project. Some of your report will be descriptive in nature (e.g. identifying the current strategic management efforts in the Navy). Other parts (the majority of the report) will require critical analysis. Having a strategic management system does not necessarily imply that it functions well or functions as it was intended. To what extent can you separate out what people describe is the strategic management process from how that process actually works, or if it works at all? Critical analysis also will be required to apply what we have learned about the mature context in business to strategic management in the Navy. What can be applied and what does not transfer?

In addition to your written report, your group is to prepare a 50-minute class presentation on your topic. If you will require a reading assignment, be sure to hand it out at least one class in advance of your presentation.

V. GRADING POLICY

The purpose of grading in this course, as in all courses, is twofold. One is to evaluate your performance for purposes of the academic system. The other (and more important) is to provide you with feedback on your ability to develop, utilize, and share your ideas and conclusions concerning the topics and situations covered in the course.

Your grade in the course will be based on the following components:

Class Participation	25%
Written Group Project	25%
Group Presentation	15%
Final Examination	35%

	100%

Group Project Grades: Group projects will be given a grade for the entire project. In addition, each student will allocate as many as 10 or as low as 0 points to each of the group members. Based on the individual's contribution to the project, this assessment will be done independently by each member of the group and turned in to the instructor, who will average all of the scores the individual receives. As an example, if a project was awarded 15 points (perfect score), and the average score an individual received was 5, the individual would receive a 20 out of a possible 25 for the group project score. This grading system takes both group and individual performance into account.

Grades for the groups classroom presentation will be assessed in a similar way: 5 points for the presentation as whole; anywhere from 0 to 10 points allocated to each person

depending on the group's assessment.

VI. OTHER ADMINISTRATIVE DETAIL

Since every faculty member tends to have somewhat different expectations as to class behavior and course norms, I'd like to outline a few of my expectations concerning such matters.

1. Because this is a case-oriented course, I consider attendance in every class extremely important. Please schedule other activities (for example field trips) at other times than MN 4105.

2. In the event that for some unavoidable reason you have to miss one class during the quarter, I would appreciate it if you would let me know that in advance of class. Also, if you do miss a class, I consider it your responsibility to find out from your classmates what materials were covered, what additional assignments were made, and what items may have been distributed in class.

3. I plan to be prepared for every class and I hope you will do the same. Since I will call on individuals whose hands are not raised, you should let me know before the start of the class if some emergency has made it impossible for you to be prepared adequately for that class.

4. I will be happy to discuss the course, your progress, or any other issues of concern to you on an individual basis. The best way to see me is during my office hours, which will be announced the first week of class. If you need to reach me at other times, please leave a message in my Administration Sciences mail box or call me at (646-2742) and I will get back to you as soon as I can.

5. I consider the Honor Code to be an extremely important part of the educational system. Group work is encouraged and appropriate for general case preparation and for the group assignment. However, any other written assignments and exams must be solely your own work.

6. Given the importance of this course, I will do everything that I can to use the class time effectively and would ask that you do the same. This will include starting, arriving, and ending on time.

VII. COURSE SCHEDULE

Part I: Strategic Management

Class 1: Introduction to Course

Overview of Course and Key Terms

Case: Robin Hood pp. 145-146

Questions: At the end of the case

Class 2: Course Preparation

Reading: Quinn, Preface xi-xv

Introduction xvii-xxv

Postscript 955-961

Group Projects: Students are to sign up for and begin to work on group project.

Class 3: What is management?: Technocratic and Political

Handouts: "The Wisdom of Difference"
"Technocratic Management versus Political Management"
"Technocratic Systems at Work"
"Political Management Systems at Work"

Questions to think about as you are reading:

1. What are the basic characteristics of technocratic management?
2. To what extent did your previous work/job involve technocratic management? Be prepared to explain.
3. What are the basic characteristics of political management?
4. To what extent did your previous work/job involve political management? Be prepared to explain.

Class 4: Strategic Thinking

Readings: Quinn, chapter 1, pp. 42-50, ch 16

Case: Guns of August

Questions: At the end of the case

Class 5: The Strategist

Readings: Quinn, chapter 2.

Case: MacArthur and the Philippines pp 147-163

Questions: At the end of the case

Class 6: Strategic Analysis

Readings: Quinn, chapter 4.

Case: Federal Express pp. 750-780

Questions: At the end of the case

Class 7: Strategic Planning

Readings: Quinn, chapter 5.

Case: Comparative Planning Systems: Litton Industries
and Texas Instruments pp. 251-269

Questions: At the end of the case

Class 8: Strategic Implementation: Organization Structure and Systems

Readings: Quinn, chapter 6.

Case: Polaroid pp 376-397

Questions: At the end of case

Class 9: Strategic Implementation: Culture

Readings: Quinn, chapter 8

Case: H-P pp. 875-898

Questions: What are the major aspects of H-P culture?

To what extent are "Japanese Management" principles similar to H-P principles of management?

Class 10: Strategic Implementation: Power

Readings: Quinn, ch 7

Case: British Steel (in class video)

Question: To what extent does power play a part in British Steel's strategy formulation?

Class 11: Strategic Implementation: Evaluation and Control

Readings: Quinn, Evaluation of a Business Strategy, pp. 50-57

Handouts: Wheelan and Hunger, "Evaluation and Control" Ratios

Case: H-P pp. 875-898

Questions: At the end of the case

How would you evaluate H-P's current strategy?

Part II: Strategic Management in Profit and Public Organizations: A Comparison

Class 12: Strategic Management in Profit and Public Organizations: The Similarities

Readings: Bryson, pp. xi-xv, 1-4, 11-21, 22-45, 46-70, 199-215, 216-230

Question: What are the similarities between public and profit organizations in terms of strategic management?

Class 13: Strategic Management in Government Agencies, Departments, the Executive Branch: The Differences

Readings: Preface and pp. 3-105 in Politics of Public Management, by Heymann

Questions: What accounts for the distinctiveness of management in the public sector?

To what extent do these distinctive aspects of public management make the application of strategic management difficult? impossible?

Class 14: Strategic Management of Government Agencies,
Departments, the Executive Branch: The Differences

Readings: pp 109-189 in Politics of Public Management
by Heymann

Questions: What accounts for the distinctiveness of
of management in the public sector?

To what extent do these distinctive aspects
of public management make the application of
strategic management difficult? impossible?

Part III: The Context and Achieving Configuration

Class 15: The Innovation Context: NASA

First Part of Class:

Readings: Quinn, pp. 516-530, pp. 606-637

1. What are the characteristics of the innovation context?
2. How is H-P an example of business in an innovation context?

Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in NASA

Readings: To Be Assigned

1. To what extent is strategic management practiced in NASA? Who is involved? What is done? When? Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in an innovation context that can be applied to Strategic Management in NASA?

Class 16: The Mature Context:

First Part of Class:

Readings: Quinn, pp. 546-558.

1. What are the characteristics of the mature context?
2. How is Exxon (pp. 457- 465) an example of business in a mature context?

Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in the Navy

Readings: To Be Assigned

1. To what extent is strategic management practiced in the Navy? Who is involved? What is done? When? Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in a mature context that can be applied to Strategic Management in the Navy?

Class 17: The Diversified Context: DoD

First Part of Class:

Readings: Quinn, pp. 577-605

1. What are the characteristics of the diversified context?
2. How is GM (pp. 480-491) an example of business in a diversified context?

Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in DoD

Readings: To Be Assigned

1. To what extent is strategic management practiced in DoD? Who is involved? What is done? When? Where? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in a diversified context that can be applied to Strategic Management in DoD?

Class 18: The Professional Context: JCS

First Part of Class:

Readings: Quinn, pp. 638-660

1. What are the characteristics of the professional context?
2. How is Davidson Hospital (pp. 864- 869) an example of a professional context?

Second Part of Class: Report on Strategic Management
in JCS

Readings: To Be Assigned

1. To what extent is strategic management practiced in the JCS? Who is involved? What is done? Where? When? Process?
2. What, if anything, can we learn from businesses in a professional context that can be applied to Strategic Management in JCS?

Class 19: Managing Transitions

Readings: Quinn, pp. 661-704

Case: DoD and The Management of Change

Questions: According to the Staff Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee, what changes are needed in DoD?

What is your evaluation of these changes?

Do you have alternative recommendations to propose?

Class 20: 1. Report on Maritime Strategy

Readings: To Be Announced

Questions: What is the Maritime Strategy?

How was this strategy devised? Who was involved? To what extent did strategic thinking and analysis and planning go into the development of the maritime strategy?

To what extent has this strategy been implemented and evaluated? With what degree of success/failure?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of this strategy?

2. Report on Competitive Strategies

Readings: To Be Announced

Questions: What are Competitive Strategies?

How were these strategies devised? Who was involved? To what extent did strategic thinking and analysis and planning go into the development of competitive strategies?

To what extent has this strategy been implemented and evaluated? With what degree of success/failure?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of this strategy?

Class 21: 1. National Security Strategy

Readings: To Be Announced

Questions: What is the National Security Strategy(ies)?

How was this strategy devised? Who was involved? To what extent did strategic thinking and analysis and planning go into the development of the National Security Strategy?

To what extent has this strategy been implemented and evaluated? With what degree of success/failure?

What are the strengths and weaknesses of this strategy?

2. Alternatives for the Future

Handouts: "The United States Isn't a Company, It's not Even Japan," pp. 169-186 in Bower

"Small May Be Beautiful, but Local Works," pp. 187-220 in Bower

"Who Leads," pp. 221-237 in Bower

Question: To what extent can the mechanisms Bower introduces be applied to DoD?

Class 22: Final Exam

VIII. JOURNALS AND REFERENCES IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT

Journals

- * Academy of Management Review
- * Business Week
- * Fortune
- * Harvard Business Review
- * Journal of Business Strategy
- * Journal of Contemporary Business
- * Journal of General Management
- * Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
- * Long Range Planning Journal
- * Managerial Planning
Planning Review
- * Policy Sciences
Policy Studies Journal
- * Public Administration Review
- * Strategic Management Journal
- * Wall Street Journal
- * available in NPS Dudley Knox Library

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